ACTION UKRAINE REPORT (AUR)
An International Newsletter, The Latest, Up-To-Date
In-Depth Ukrainian News, Analysis and Commentary
Ukrainian History, Culture, Arts, Religion, Business, Economics,
Sports, Government, and Politics, in Ukraine and Around the World
ACTION UKRAINE REPORT (AUR), Number 951
Mr. Morgan Williams, Publisher and Editor, SigmaBleyzer Emerging
Markets Private Equity Investment Group, www.SigmaBleyzer.com
WASHINGTON, D.C., SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2010
INDEX OF ARTICLES ------
Clicking on the title of any article takes you directly to the article.
Return to Index by clicking on Return to Index at the end of each article
1. UKRAINE'S TYMOSHENKO DROPS LEGAL CHALLENGE ON ELECTION
Natalya Zinets and Richard Balmforth, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat, Feb 20, 2010
2. TIMOSHENKO DROPS APPEAL, CEDES VICTORY TO YANUKOVYCH
By Daryna Krasnolutska and Kateryna Choursina, Bloomberg
Kiev, Ukraine, Saturday, February 20, 2010
3. SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT ACCEPTSTYMOSHENKO'S DECISION
TO WITHDRAW HER APPEAL AGAINST RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Ukrainian News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sat, February 20, 2010
4. LOSER IN UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS COULD BE THE LAW
Analysis & Commentary: by John Marone, Columnist, Kyiv
Eurasian Home website, Moscow, Russia, Fri, February 19, 2010
5. YANUKOVICH CANNOT AFFORD AN EXCLUSIVELY PRO-RUSSIAN POLICY
Analysis & Commentary: by Aleksei Malashenko, Carnegie Moscow Center
Kommersant, Moscow, Russia, February 17, 2010
6. UKRAINE'S ELECTIONS: A WATERSHED OR NEW STALEMATE?
Analysis& Commentary: By James Sherr, Head, Russia & Eurasia Programme
Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs
Chatham House Programme Paper, London, UK, Thu, 18 Feb 2010
7. UKRAINIAN, RUSSIAN SYSTEMS COMPARED IN LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN ELECTION RESULTS
Analysis & Commentary by Stanislav Belkovskiy: "On Hitler, Freedom and Wealth of Peoples"
Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, Moscow, Russia, Fri, February 12, 2010
8. STOP ALREADY WITH THE IS UKRAINE TILTING EAST OR WEST OBSESSION
Analysis & Commentary: By Nadia McConnell and Irene Jarosewich
Aha! Network, Washington, D.C., Friday, February 19, 2010
9. NARROW YANUKOVYCH VICTORY IN UKRAINE ELECTION FOLLOWED BY CONTINUING STRUGGLE
ANALYSIS: OSC, US Open Source Center, Wash, D.C., Wed, Feb 17, 2010
10. PUTIN SHOULD BEWARE OF KIEV POLL AFTERTASTE
Analysis & Commentary: By Stefan Wagstyl in London
Financial Times, London, UK, Tue, Feb 16, 2010
11. GORBACHEV HOPES YANUKOVICH TO OVERCOME AMERICAN FACTOR
Itar-Tass, Moscow, Russia, Sat, Feb 13, 2010
12. UKRAINE'S OUTGOING PRESIDENT WARNS OF TURN EAST
Associated Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Tue, February 16, 2010
13. BULGAKOV IS ONCE AGAIN OUR GUIDE TO UKRAINE
Analysis & Commentary: By Misha Glenny, Financial Times, London, UK, Fri, Feb 12 2010
14. UKRAINE'S RADICALLY DIFFERENT CONFLICT
Letter-to-the-Editor, From Dr. Igor Torbakov
RE: 'Bulgakov is once again our guide to Ukraine' by Misha Glenny
Financial Times, London, UK, February 20 2010
15. UKRAINE'S ELECTION: NO CHANGE WE CAN ENTIRELY BELIEVE IN
Commentary & Analysis: Wayne Merry, Senior Associate
American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), Wash, D.C., Tue, Feb 16, 2010
16. COULD PARTITION SOLVE UKRAINE'S PROBLEMS?
Analysis & Commentary: By Ethan S. Burger
Open Democracy, London, UK, Fri, February 19, 2010
17. UKRAINE'S POST-ELECTION "TO-DO" LIST
Analysis & Commentary: by David J. Kramer, Senior Transatlantic Fellow
German Marshall Fund (GMF), Wash, D.C., Thu, Feb 11, 2010
18. UKRAINE UNDER YANUKOVYCH: RELATIONS WITH THE EU
Euractiv.com, Brussels, Belgium, Thu, 18 February 2010
19. DEFENDING DEMOCRACY: TYMOSHENKO TAKES BATTLE TO THE COURTS
INFORM: Newsletter for the international community providing
views and analysis from the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, Feb 15, 2010, Issue 141
20. THE REVOLUTION IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION
Just because the Orange revolutionaries lost in Ukraine, doesn't mean their cause did.
Analysis & Commentary: By David J. Kramer, Foreign Policy, Wash, D.C., Mon, Feb 8, 2
21. IN UKRAINE THE NEXT POLITICAL WAR BEGINS
Analysis & Commentary: By Tammy Lynch, The ISCIP Analyst
An Analytical Review, Volume XVI, No. 8, Boston University,
Boston, MA, Thursday, 18 February 10, 2010
22. INSIDE UKRAINE: YANUKOVYCH UNCOVERED
Analysis & Commentary: By Ivan Poltavets and Ievgenii Rovnyi
Inside Ukraine #5, International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, February 18, 2010
23. CURING 'UKRAINE FATIGUE'
Op-Ed, By Steven Pifer, The New York Times, NY, NY, Tue, Feb 9, 2010
24. UKRAINE WILL BE A BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Opinion Europe: By Victor Yanukovych
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, Wed, Feb 17, 2010
25. YANUKOVYCH'S RUSSIAN OVERTURES MAY SIGNAL UKRAINE'S ALLEGIANCE
By Daryna Krasnolutska and Lyubov Pronina
Bloomberg News, Kiev, Ukraine, Wed, Feb 17, 2010
26. RE-INTRODUCING VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH
Opinion Europe, Analysis & Commentary: By Adrian Karatnycky
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, Monday, February 8, 2010
27. UKRAINE ELECTIONS: LET'S NOT GET CARRIED AWAY
Commentary by Nikolas Gvosdev, New Atlanticist Blog
The Atlantic Council, Wash, D.C., Mon, February 08, 2010
28. 'THE SOVIET STORY': A MUST SEE DOCUMENTARY
Commentary: By Robert McConnell, Vice President, Armor Designs
Co-Founder, U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF), Wash, D.C., Sat, Jan 27, 2010
29. NO REFUTING THE HARD TRUTHS IN 'THE SOVIET STORY'
By Peter Worthington, Columnist, The Toronto Sun
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Wednesday, 3 Feb 2010
30. THE SOVIET STORY: FILM TELLS THE STORY OF THE SOVIET REGIME
BuyUkraine.org website, USUF, Washington, D.C. Fall, 2009
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1. UKRAINE'S TYMOSHENKO DROPS LEGAL CHALLENGE ON ELECTION
Natalya Zinets and Richard Balmforth, Reuters, Kiev, Ukraine, Sat, Feb 20, 2010
KIEV - Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko on Saturday dropped her legal case challenging the election of rival Viktor Yanukovich as president, saying the court could not be trusted to reach a fair verdict.
The about-turn by the fiery Tymoshenko left the way clear for Yanukovich to be inaugurated as president on February 25 as scheduled -- though she herself still insisted he had not been legitimately elected.
The charismatic 49-year-old premier, who had alleged vote cheating by her opponent in the February 7 runoff and had been pressing for a new round of voting, said she was withdrawing her legal case because the court had refused to study the evidence she had put before it.
"It became clear to us that the court has not given itself the aim of establishing the truth," she told Ukraine's Higher Administrative Court. "Under these circumstances, we simply do not see the reason for continuing with this case being considered. We are withdrawing our suit."
Yanukovich, 59, has denied any vote-rigging by his side. He beat Tymoshenko by a narrow 3.5 percentage points in the February 7 vote.
Few commentators had expected Tymoshenko to win the court action, which she launched on Friday with a plea to the 49 judges to "study carefully" the evidence before it. But her sudden announcement on Saturday took most people by surprise all the same.
With her hair plaited in her trademark peasant braid, she looked tired and
tense on Saturday as she announced her climb-down after months of battling with
Yanukovich for the leadership of the former Soviet republic of 46 million.
But she refused to concede his victory had been honestly won and a deputy of
her BYuT political bloc said it would boycott his swearing-in next Thursday."A fraudulent vote took place and the will of the people was fraudulently
handled. Sooner or later, an honest prosecutor's office and an honest court
will come to the view that Yanukovich was not elected president of Ukraine and
that the will of the people was falsified," she said.
Tymoshenko
had been pressing for a new presidential vote as took place in the 2004
"Orange Revolution" which ended with President Viktor Yushchenko
being elected. Yanukovich was denied the top job then by the protests against
electoral fraud.
GROUND CUT AWAY BY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS
Some of the
ground had been cut from under Tymoshenko by Western governments which quickly
congratulated Yanukovich on his victory and privately urged her to gracefully
accept defeat.
Yushchenko,
once her Orange Revolution ally and now her political foe, added to pressure on
her on Saturday by also telephoning Yanukovich and congratulating him as the
legitimately elected president-to-be. Her change-of-heart may have been caused
by the sudden realization that she was consistently losing ground.
"Tymoshenko's
decision was motivated by the fact that she realized she had no prospects by
this court action. By withdrawing her action, she has in fact recognized
Yanukovich's victory," analyst Vadim Karacayev said.
Some
of her advisers had warned her that she could damage her huge standing by
refusing to bow to the inevitable and had urged her save her energies for a
future in opposition.
In
the past few weeks, she has lost one battle after another against Yanukovich
who, while not a great public performer himself, is backed by wealthy
industrialists who have organized a strong team of strategists for him.
On
one occasion, she threatened to wage a second Orange Revolution to bring people
out on to the street if she felt the vote had been rigged. But she drew jeers
from her rivals when she later publicly backed down on the threat.
Her climb-down defused much of the political tension which has gripped the
country and it seemed likely to be welcomed by investors who are anxiously
awaiting the return of political stability in Ukraine.
The country, whose economy took a battering in the global downturn with its
valuable steel exports losing markets, has been relying on a $16.4 billion
bail-out program from the International Monetary Fund.
This has been suspended because of breached promises, but is expected to resume
once political stability returns. Tymoshenko is now likely to switch her
energies to the political fight against Yanukovich, whose supporters in
parliament on Friday took the first steps to force her out as prime minister.
After a bitter campaign of smears and insults, Yanukovich has ruled out any
alliance with her and has asked her to quit. She has refused and can be
replaced only when the Yanukovich camp has managed to forge a new coalition
among the fickle deputies of Ukraine's parliament -- normally a long and tricky
task. If he fails to do this, he may be forced to call early parliamentary
elections. (Writing by Richard Balmforth; editing by Angus MacSwan)
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2.
TIMOSHENKO DROPS APPEAL,
CEDES VICTORY TO YANUKOVYCH
By Daryna Krasnolutska and Kateryna Choursina, Bloomberg
Kiev,
Ukraine, Saturday, February 20, 2010
KIEV
- Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko withdrew her appeal against
the Feb. 7 presidential election result in the country’s Higher Administrative
Court, ceding victory to Viktor Yanukovych.
Timoshenko
decided to give up her fight for the presidency after the court rejected her
request for a recount of votes and questioning of witnesses, the premier said
in a statement on her Web site today. Yanukovych had been declared winner by
the Central Election Commission and is due to be sworn into office on Feb. 25.
“There
is no sense” in continuing the hearing, Timoshenko said in the statement. “The
court has refused to find out the truth and I wanted to stop this performance that
has nothing in common with justice.” Court spokeswoman Maria Shvynko said the
court cannot close the case and has to continue the hearing, adding that judges
are discussing how to proceed behind closed doors.
International
observers have said the vote met democratic standards and the U.S., European
Union, Russia and NATO have recognized Yanukovych’s victory. Still, Timoshenko
claimed she had evidence that more than 1 million votes were falsified.
“The
Higher Administrative Court of appeal is the last and only resort,” said
Oleksandr Chernenko, head of Ukraine’s Committee of Voters, in a phone
interview before the hearing. “There will be not a single possibility to
appeal.”
‘CLOSE THE CASE’
Oleksandr
Lavrynovych, a deputy parliamentary speaker and a Yanukovych party member told
reporters today in the court that “from a judicial point of view this means
that there may be an end to the hearing today as Timoshenko left the court
building and the code of procedures allows the court to close the case.”
Outgoing
President Viktor Yushchenko, who beat Yanukovcyh five years ago, congratulated
him today on a “legitimate victory”, according to a statement on the
presidential Web site. Yushchenko also issued an order setting up a special
committee to organize the inauguration and told the Foreign Affairs Ministry to
invite foreign guests for the event, according to the Web site.
The
political stasis has delayed chances of forming a new government to tackle
Ukraine’s economic slump. Gross domestic product shrank 15 percent in 2009, the
most since 1994, and the hryvnia has lost 41.49 percent against the dollar
since September 2008. Ukraine was forced to turn to the International Monetary
Fund for a bailout in November 2008 as the financial crisis squashed demand for
its exports and dried up investments.
DEBT INSURANCE
Ukraine’s
sovereign debt is the third most expensive to insure after Venezuela and
Argentina, according to credit default swap spreads. The country’s CDS spread
has widened almost four times after the 2004 Orange Revolution, indicating
heightened investor perceptions of a default risk, and stood at 978.9 basis
points yesterday, compared with 946 before Feb. 5, according to Bloomberg data.
Yanukovych has urged Timoshenko to resign as prime minister and move into
opposition, allowing him to form a new coalition in parliament and appoint a
Cabinet. Timoshenko has refused.
Lawmakers
supporting Yanukovych registered a no-confidence resolution in Parliament to
topple Timoshenko’s government.
The resolution was published on Parliament’s Web site yesterday and may be
voted on in March as the Kiev-based legislature meets next week only for the
inauguration of Yanukovych.
FIRST CHALLENGE
The new president’s first challenge will be to form a majority in the 450-seat
Kiev-based assembly to oust Timoshenko. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions would
need to secure 226 votes to back the bill. If the vote is successful,
Timoshenko’s government would remain in power in a caretaker capacity until a
new administration is formed.
The
current coalition of 245 seats includes Timoshenko’s bloc, outgoing President
Viktor Yushchenko’s bloc and parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn’s party.
Yanukovych, with 172 seats, will need to secure 27 seats from the communist
party, 20 seats from Lytvyn’s party and at least 7 lawmakers from Timoshenko or
Yushchenko’s blocs to garner a majority. Yanukovych has said that if he fails
to create a majority, he will call early parliamentary elections.
NOTE: With assistance from Paul Abelsky in Moscow. Editors: Douglas Lytle,
Chris Kirkham. To contact the reporter on this story: Daryna Krasnolutska in
Kiev at +38-044-490-1252 or dkrasnolutsk@bloomberg.net
Kateryna Choursina in Kiev at +38-044-490-1282 or kchoursina@bloomberg.net. To contact
the editor responsible for this story: Tasneem Brogger at +44-20-7330-7794 or tbrogger@bloomberg.net Chris Kirkham
at +44-20-7673-2464 or ckirkham@bloomberg.net.
LINK:
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-20/timoshenko-withdraws-vote-appeal-cedes-victory-to-yanukovych.html
AUR FOOTNOTE: Several very seasoned,
well-informed experts in Ukraine indicate the size of the
election fraud in the presidential election was much larger than was
reported by the international election observers and their organizations.
Such observers could only cover a small fraction of the total number of polling
stations. Most of the voter fraud in Ukraine is not really readily
visible, of course, to international election observers and some of it is
extremely difficult to track and prove legally without huge and extensive
monitoring resources. The experts in Ukraine were very surprised
that the international organizations gave such a total clean bill of
heath to the election and that so many governments publically endorsed the
findings before the election commission in Ukraine issued their decision.
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3.
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE
COURT ACCEPTS TYMOSHENKO'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW HER APPEAL AGAINST RESULTS OF
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Ukrainian
News Agency, Kyiv, Ukraine, Sat, February 20, 2010
KYIV
- The Supreme Administrative Court has accepted Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's
decision to withdraw her appeal against the results of the Ukrainian
presidential elections. Presiding judge Oleksandr Nechytailo announced
the court's decision to accept the withdrawal request.
The court rejected Tymoshenko's claim that election rigging was proven during
the consideration of the appeal. The court's decision is final and not
subject to appeal.
As Ukrainian News earlier reported, Tymoshenko earlier told the court that she
was withdrawing her appeal against the results of the presidential elections
and left the court building.
Tymoshenko told journalists that the court was biased and expressed the view
that the court refused to allow live broadcast of its proceedings because it
did not want Ukrainians to see how it refused to admit significant evidence of
election rigging.
Earlier,
the Supreme Administrative Court agreed to summon five members of the Central
Electoral Commission as witnesses in the appeal case but rejected 13 witnesses.
The
court also rejected Tymoshenko's petition to accept as evidence data from the
state register of voters regarding inclusion of individual voters on the
register numerous times and the names of dead people on the register.
Tymoshenko filed the appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court on February
16 and asked the court to order a repeat of the second round of the
presidential elections.
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4.
LOSER IN UKRAINIAN
ELECTIONS COULD BE THE LAW
Analysis &
Commentary: by John Marone, Columnist, Kyiv
Eurasian
Home website, Moscow, Russia, Fri, February 19, 2010
Another colorful Ukrainian election has been held, to the indifference of many
voters and the relief of many foreign investors and governments.
And while Victor Yanukovych is still trying to uphold his victory against the
legal objections being raised by challenger Yulia Tymoshenko, the law itself
could be defrauded.
Respected European observers such as the OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament and others have endorsed
the election as free and fair. World leaders such as Obama and Sarkozy sent
their congratulations before the official results were released.
Indeed, compared to the falsification fest of 2004, in which Mr. Yanukovych
featured most prominently as the opponent of Ukrainian democracy, the voting on
February 7 was truly an achievement.
Tymoshenko may have been the heroine of the 2004 Orange Revolution that forced
Yanukovych to eventually concede defeat, but this time she is beginning to look
like a sore loser. Nevertheless, the lady in braids, alleging widespread
cheating, has vowed to let the courts decide the issue.
This
is all in keeping with the law. The issue here is not about ballot-box stuffing
or padded elections rolls, which by most accounts definitely occurred on both
sides of the political divide.
The
issue here is how real power will be transferred in Ukraine, now that the vote
has been cast and counted.
Western
governments and investors had good reason to feel relief when the election
results failed to set off confrontations between opposing protesters on the
streets of Kyiv. But they might have taken heed of the low voter turnout or the
large number of people who voted “against all”.
The
sad fact is that neither candidate enjoys a clear popular mandate, and that the
electorate is highly cynical about the choice they were presented with. Many
simply voted out of a vague notion of East versus West.
The ball has now been passed firmly into the
hands of professional politicians.
It’s among them where the law gets stretched, mangled, torn, re-sewn, put
through a bleaching and then hung out to dry behind a wall of opaque legal
terms.
Since its Independence nearly 20 years ago, Ukraine has struggled to make the
transition to law-based society. Ironically, however, that transition hit its
first reversal during the Orange Revolution, when hundreds of thousands of
pro-democracy protesters took to the streets to demand that their vote be
counted – honestly.
Orange leader and now lame-duck Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko, apparently
frightened of the opposition that the old guard were putting up to the
revolution, agreed to a controversial and hastily drafted set of changes to the
country’s constitution, which essentially guaranteed the five years of chaos
that his presidency has come to be associated with.
The
crux of the amendments was the creation of a sort of executive nihilism in the
country, which has had the effect of turning every government appointment,
every state program and every election into a pitched battle.
It
is really no small feat that Ukraine’s election came off peacefully, despite
Ms. Tymoshenko’s tenacity in contesting its fairness.
However,
Ms. Tymoshenko’s energy would be much better spent preparing for a vigorous
role in the opposition – to defend the law.
Mr.
Yanukovych has been given the benefit of the doubt by Ukrainian voters and the
international community, but the coming months will show whether his
post-revolution reputation as a Kremlin stooge and former thug were justified.
For one thing, just like Yushchenko, Yanukovych will inherit a presidency much
weakened from the years leading up to the Orange Revolution, when presidents
such as Leonid Kuchma hired and fired premiers like secretaries, forged foreign
policy like kings and showered their cronies with economic advantage.
But
if Yanukovych can cobble together a coalition under his sway (something that
Yushchenko was never able to do), he can put all kinds of initiatives into
effect.
Achieving a consensus is, of course, the stuff of a real democracy,
but not if it is based on bribed or bullied lawmakers. Many of those who make
up the ranks of Ukraine’s parliament got in on vast party lists rather than
campaigning individually under a party platform.
With the exception of the Communists, there is in fact very little difference
in the platforms of Ukraine’s four other factions. Yanukovych’s Regions Party
is perceived as closer to eastern Ukraine and Russia, while the rest are more
or less centre-right and nominally pro-European.
So,
a future coalition would largely represent a compromise among various business
interests and state posts (i.e. feeding troughs) rather than among policies
filtered up from the electorate.
More
alarming is that the Region political machine could be able to convince the
Supreme Court to reverse the constitutional amendments of 2004 altogether,
making Yanukovych a virtual czar.
For
all his faults, Yushchenko never abused the authority retained by the
presidency to control the SBU (successor to the KGB) or Prosecutor-General’s
Office. The more disciplined and feisty Regions clan may not be so gentle. For
one thing, Yushchenko always kept in office prosecutors-general linked to
former President Kuchma or Regions, which many analysts have also interpreted
as a concession to the old guard in 2004.
Short
of such a drastic scenario, we can already see at least a crumbling up of
Ukraine’s law. For instance, unable to force Ms. Tymoshenko from government,
Regions lawmakers are insisting that their colleagues in the government’s
coalition have the right to jump ship without the need for snap elections (by
refusing to sign an allegiance to the faction).
The
irritating thing about such an initiative is that few of these lawmakers would
have ever gotten into the parliament without being included under their
parties’ banners.
Mr.
Yanukovych has returned to claim the presidency in 2010 not despite the law, as
in 2004, but because of it.
But
if Ukrainian lawmakers are allowed to pervert the coalition-making process, if
the courts are once again employed as a rubber stamps for political expedience,
while prosecutors and security forces bully any opposition, the
law will turn out to be the only loser in the February 07 election.
LINK:
http://www.eurasianhome.org/xml/t/opinion.xml?lang=en&nic=opinion&pid=1528
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5.
YANUKOVICH CANNOT AFFORD
AN EXCLUSIVELY PRO-RUSSIAN POLICY
Russia had better stop pushing Victor Yanukovich
Aleksei Malashenko, Carnegie Moscow Center
Kommersant, Moscow, Russia, February 17, 2010
What capital should Victor Yanukovich visit first after his inauguration? There
might be some who will find it a rhetoric question. Why, Moscow, of
course. After all, it is Russia that has always pinned hopes on Yanukovich, at
least publicly. Time to live up to the expectations at long last.
President Dmitry Medvedev invited his Ukrainian vis-a-vis to Russia as though
to remind Yanukovich of it. Now that Victor Yuschenko is as good as gone,
Ukraine is once again moving into the focus of Moscow's attention. Speaking of
official Kiev's future foreign policy, most experts say that the new president
will concentrate on promotion of Ukrainian interests.
Moreover, it will be up to Yanukovich to decide if these interests tally with
the interests of Russia - and to what degree if they do. It is this knowledge
that makes Moscow fret and that foments the desire to tell the new Ukrainian
leader what the correct choice is.
Yanukovich's inauguration is still in the future and so is a new ruling
coalition in the Rada, but the other Russian leader is already condemning
"leadership of the color movement" for its choice of "political
sponsors". Answering Russian Premier Vladimir Putin, Yuschenko warned that
"nobody would dare" revoke his decree that made Stepan Bandera Hero
of Ukraine.
Yanukovich is thus demanded to make up his mind. And what does Moscow expect
him to choose when he needs the parliamentary majority which he will never have
without Yuschenko's following in the Rada?
It is necessary to remember that winner of the 2010 presidential race polled
under 50%. Or that all of Ukraine (some with curses, others with elation)
regards him as a pro-Russian politician.
In the meantime, recalling this nuance at the earliest opportunity is reckless,
to put it mildly. Moscow's attempts to push Yanukovich will only make him
wary and compel him to keep proving to the Ukrainians that he is an independent
leader of a sovereign state.
It does not take a genius to see that Yanukovich cannot afford an exclusively
pro-Russian foreign policy. He is more likely to promote the policy of European
integration. Sure, he will be looking over his shoulder at Moscow every now and
then but Moscow had better hold its horses.
The more pressure it applies to Yanukovich, the more motivated he will feel to
prove his pro-European nature - to the world, to Ukraine, and to himself.
Should Moscow keep squeezing the life out of Kiev in its bearish hug, it will
eventually break away and ditch Russia for good.
LINK: www.kommersant.com
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6.
UKRAINE'S ELECTIONS: A
WATERSHED OR NEW STALEMATE?
Analysis
& Commentary: By James Sherr
Head,
Russia & Eurasia Programme
Chatham
House, Royal Institute of International Affairs
Chatham House Programme Paper, London, UK, Thu, 18 Feb 2010
On 14 February, Ukraine’s Central Electoral Commission officially declared
Viktor Federovych Yanukovych the country’s fourth elected president since
Ukraine declared independence on 24 August 1991. It was, in the words of
Ukraine’s authoritative web-based journal Glavred, ‘the most boring election in
the history of Ukraine’s independence’. That is good news.
In
Russia elections are boring because one knows who is going to win. In Ukraine
no one has any idea who will win, nevertheless elections are boring. That is
one of the Orange Revolution’s few triumphs.
But worries now overshadow them. For nineteen years Ukraine has defined itself
unequivocally as a European rather than a Eurasian state, and it generally has
been accepted that the quality of its independence is inseparable from its
ability to distinguish itself from Russia.
Leonid
Kuchma, the author of Ukraine’s controversial ‘multi-vector policy’, which
during the ten years of his presidency (1994-2004) sought to counterbalance
Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, was also the author of a book entitled
Ukraine Is Not Russia. Today, many hope and many fear that this era is drawing
to a close.
The truth of the matter will not be known for some time, and it will not be
determined by Yanukovych alone. If, as expected, his victory is confirmed
by the courts (who face legal challenges from his rival, Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko), he will come to power in an economically ruined country, deeply
dependent on Western-dominated financial institutions.
He
will also be governing a highly pluralistic state and will swiftly find (if he
does not grasp the point already) that he will not be able to use power
effectively unless he shares it. His parliamentary coalition will have to be
based on compromises if it is to endure at all.
Most
offices of state, not to say the most competent officials in the country, link
Ukraine’s future with Europe, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and armed
forces have acquired a decidedly Euro-Atlantic orientation. The more
competitive business sector is not only drawn to European markets, but
increasingly to a European model that promises emancipation from the
rent-seeking bureaucracies, avaricious politicians, shadowy intermediaries and
weak property rights that have plagued economic relations in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, as President, Yanukovych will wield considerable power, and it is
prudent to worry about how he might use it. He will also have the support
of a large, embittered and vindicated constituency which, unlike the
disillusioned supporters of Tymoshenko, loathed the Orange Revolution too much
to feel betrayed by it. For most of his career, Yanukovych has behaved in
accordance with the axiom, ‘influence is good, control is better’.
Although
keen to appear as an exponent of consensus and reconciliation in his scripted
audiences with Western journalists, his less guarded comments suggest that the
instinct for domination has not disappeared. Speaking on Rossiya 24
television on 13 February, he stated, ‘[t]he new authorities have come.
The old authorities, who have not been recognised by the Ukrainian people at
this election, should go’. ‘Not recognised’ is a bold statement for
someone whose victory rests on 3.48 percent of the vote.
THINKING THE WORST
Yanukovych,
his inner circle and his constituency are also convinced that a course that
sets Ukraine at cross purposes with Russia is dangerous for the country’s
security and distressing to the majority of its people. However, the risk
is not that Yanukovych, any more than Kuchma, will choose to be a ‘vassal of Russia’.
It is that the steps he takes will inadvertently damage his other professed
objectives: closer relations with the EU, cooperation with NATO and the
economic success of Ukraine.
These
worries will now be felt in four key areas of policy:
[1] Energy. Yanukovych has articulated two firm principles
regarding energy. He will renegotiate the Tymoshenko-Putin January 2009
Ukraine-Russia gas supply contract (which, in the opinion of most energy
specialists, has brought greater transparency to European energy markets), and
he will resurrect the 2002 scheme to transfer ownership of Ukraine’s
state-owned gas transit system to a three-way consortium. As he told
Russia-24, ‘I would like us to return to the format of relations we had five
years ago’. Yet five years ago, there was no gas consortium, because
Kuchma had no intention of going forward with it.
There
also were no bypass projects, such as South Stream, which Yanukovych hopes
Russia will now abandon. What existed then were heavily subsidised gas prices,
which Yanukovych plainly hopes Russia will restore in exchange for de facto
ownership of the gas transit system. What also existed and what President
Yushchenko, to everyone’s surprise, revived was an opaquely structured market
dominated by intermediaries.
A
key stakeholder in these arrangements, Yuriy Boyko, a former chairman of the
state-owned supply company, Naftohaz, and subsequently Minister of Fuel and
Energy, is now widely tipped to return to the latter post. If
Yanukovych’s aspirations bear fruit, they will have a profoundly retrograde
effect on European gas markets.
They
will reverse the trends in the direction of market-based pricing, which have
been gathering momentum even in Russia’s internal market, and to diminished
dependency on Russian supplies. They will remove the greatest impetus towards
energy diversification and efficiency in Ukraine (which, before the financial
crisis, was the sixth largest consumer of natural gas in the world).
They
will deprive Ukraine of leverage in future pricing disputes with Russia. Not
least of all, they will demolish the rationale for proceeding with EU and
US-sponsored modernisation schemes, such as the 23 March 2009 EU-Ukraine
agreement, and they will threaten future IMF assistance.
[2] Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, whose lease in Crimea,
according to the 1997 accords, is due to expire in 2017. That Yanukovych
is open to extending the lease is unsurprising, and it is widely rumoured that
Tymoshenko expressed the same openness to Prime Minister Putin during the gas
negotiations of November 2009. But under today’s terms, which
render significant aspects of the Fleet’s activity—economic, military and
intelligence related—unspecified and unregulated?
Or
on the basis of a NATO-style Status of Forces Agreement which would subject
these activities to codification, oversight and agreement? Thus far, Yanukovych
has spoken only of a ‘package’ embracing ‘quite a few issues’, and this
does not quell fears that he would allow today’s murky and potentially menacing
arrangements to continue.
[3] NATO. Yanukovych’s pledge to ‘participate actively’ in President
Medvedev’s European security initiative will mean little until the West’s core
institutions, NATO, the EU and the OSCE agree to do the same. His formula
of maintaining cooperation with NATO whilst deferring discussion of membership
for the indefinite future means equally little in view of political realities
in Europe. But what will ‘cooperation’ mean in practice?
Today
it means an institutionalised role for NATO in Ukrainian defence reform and the
extensive participation of Ukrainian armed forces in NATO-led operations.
Until a new defence minister is appointed, it is impossible to say which of
these arrangements will continue and in what form. Were the NATO-Ukraine
Commission and joint planning process to dissolve, the relationship as it has
evolved since 1997 would cease to exist.
[4] Economic Stability and EU Relations. The revival of
Kuchma-style hard corruption, not to say politically repressive measures, would
take EU-Ukraine cooperation off the table. The appointment to the premiership
of Mykola Azarov, architect of the Kuchma-era tax police and, by many accounts,
some of the financially coercive measures of that era, would give substance to
the first worry, if not the second.
The
appointment of Serhiy Lavochkin (former adviser to Kuchma) as Chief of Staff
and Boyko’s reappointment would add to these worries, which surely would be
compounded in the event of a major redistribution of property and a
reopening of investigations against Tymoshenko for alleged wrongdoing in the
1990s. The ranks of those seeking revenge and restitution are not small.
(Boyko himself was twice interrogated by the Security Services (SBU) in 2005
and, according to its then chairman and Tymoshenko loyalist, Aleksandr
Turchynov, was on the point of arrest).
This catalogue of dread, assiduously presented by Yulia Tymoshenko’s campaign
team, would fundamentally alter Ukraine’s place in Europe. But is it
realistic?
THE RATIONALITY OF HOPE
There are four good reasons to hope that it is not realistic:
[1] Parliament. Without a parliamentary
majority, the new president’s top appointments will not be confirmed. At
present, Tymoshenko still enjoys a de jure majority, and her ouster as Prime
Minister could prove more difficult than many assume. Yanukovych’s Party
of Regions is well short of a majority, with 172 seats in the 450-member
unicameral chamber, the Verkhovna Rada. Were the Communists (27 seats)
and the bloc of the Rada’s chairman, Volodymyr Lytvyn (20 seats) to join them,
they would be in striking distance of one, but the terms demanded by the
Communists might be unpalatable to Lytvyn’s supporters and many inside Regions
itself.
It
is more likely that a majority of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine People’s
Self-Defence bloc (36 out of 71) would join Regions in coalition along with
Lytvyn and even some 20-25 members of the 153-member Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko.
But there would be terms: sooner or later, the return of a ‘safe pair of hands’
like Yuriy Yekhanurov as Prime Minister (the post he held under Yushchenko
between September 2005 and August 2006) and prominent positions for Petro
Poroshenko (current Minister of Foreign Affairs) and several other ‘pragmatic’
figures in the Orange pantheon.
Moreover,
Yanukovych would have to maintain this majority by pursuing policies that it
will support. His threat to escape these constraints by calling a snap
election rings increasingly hollow. The gap between him and Tymoshenko
was rapidly closing in the hours before polls closed on the 7th, and the odds
are that a new election will return fewer seats to Regions than it already has.
The
certainty of a tough parliamentary opposition, the growing capacity of
third-force politicians like Serhiy Tyhypko, Arseniy Yatseniuk and Anatoliy
Grytsenko and the approach of local elections (30 May) will only add to the
ranks of those determined to hold Yanukovych to account.
[2] Divisions in the Party of Regions. Viktor Yanukovych
might be an authoritarian figure, but by comparison to the personalised Bloc of
Yulia Tymoshenko, the Party of Regions is a pluralistic party. The
party’s biggest financier and Ukraine’s richest man, Rinat Akhmetov, has no wish
to see Ukraine put additional barriers between itself and Europe, whether
through defiance or incompetence. Like at least half of the party elite, the
most probable new foreign minister, Konstyantyn Gryshchenko (now ambassador in
Moscow), has never sought integration with Russia, but integration with Europe
by means that do not antagonise Russia.
Yanukovych
himself whilst in office always kept his distance from the dogmas of the
party’s ‘swamp’, which he thunderously defended on the campaign trial. He
has already backed away from his promise to make Russian an official language,
instead calling for observing the European Charter for Regional and Minority
Languages ‘which will enable the Russian-speaking population and other ethnic
groups to speak their mother tongue’. As Prime Minister under Kuchma, he
was the architect of the NATO-Ukraine memorandum on strategic airlift and
supported the Membership Action Plan that he now opposes.
[3] A Transformed Energy Market. Yanukovych’s gas consortium
initiative is out of kilter with economic and political reality. For one
thing, two gas crises and the Russia-Georgia war have changed the climate in
Europe. Diversification and marketisation are now seen as imperatives, and the
measures proposed by the European Commission have begun to take root.
Two
years ago, the odds were very strong against the Nabucco pipeline being built;
today they are moderately in favour. The global economic crisis, the rapid
expansion of US gas production and the attractiveness of LNG have created a
more open gas market and a sharp fall of demand for Russian pipeline gas. The
German appetite for the consortium is therefore not what it was.
Although
the ambitions of Gazprom and the Kremlin to control Ukraine’s GTS are
unchanged, Yanukovych’s quid pro quo—a return to subsidies—is not only
unpalatable, but unaffordable. Those in Moscow most expected to welcome his
proposal are likely to cold shoulder it. So, very likely, are the
parliamentarians of Ukraine who would be obliged to overturn the 2006 law
prohibiting such a step (which at the time Yanukovych supported).
[4] Relations with the West. The West’s influence
is now inescapable, however Washington and Brussels plan to make use of it.
Ukraine’s GDP fell by 14 percent in 2009, inflation is running at an annual
rate of over 12 percent, budget revenue plunged by 20 percent, banking deposits
by 26 percent, and capital flight rose to $13.6 bn. External debt exceeds $30 bn,
and debt servicing requirements stand at $4 bn per annum.
Debt
servicing terms, credit ratings and macro-economic assistance are hostage to
the confidence of the Western banks and institutions upon which Ukraine is now
dependent. The basis for a policy of conditionality is possibly stronger
than it ever has been, and it will be puzzling if Western representatives and
prominent Ukrainians do not point this out.
Given all these factors, it would be surprising if Yanukovych’s presidency did
not enhance what has been the defining feature of Ukraine’s political
culture: distrust of power. The country that elected him seeks stability,
not repression, and if Yanukovych forgets this, he will swiftly discover that
the polity is far from powerless. Whether this mixture of ambitions,
impulses, pragmatism and constraints leads to responsible government, a new set
of stalemates or a muddle remains to be seen. But the West needs to be
acting, not just watching, because once again there is everything to play for.
NOTE: This article was published by AUR with the
permission of the author, James Sherr.
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Service]
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7.
UKRAINIAN, RUSSIAN
SYSTEMS COMPARED IN LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN ELECTION RESULTS
Analysis
& Commentary by Stanislav Belkovskiy: "On Hitler, Freedom and Wealth
of Peoples"
Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, Moscow, Russia, Fri, February 12, 2010
We really do not want to argue with Yuliya Latynina herself, but we will have
to do so. Otherwise, Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal readers may think that practically a
Hitler has come to power in Ukraine, and that the right of the Ukrainian people
to choose a president for themselves has been discredited once and for all.
And so, let us proceed in order.
[1] First of all.
Today, there
really is a very bold and talented charismatic leader in Ukraine. A left-wing
populist who in hers political-economic views is close to Hugo Chavez, and by
her ability to mesmerize the popular masses with unpardonable demagoguery - is
only slightly beneath Adolph Hitler. This politician is Yuliya Tymoshenko.
Two years ago, when Tymoshenko became Prime Minister of Ukraine for the second
time, and a year ago, when she cobbled together her new coalition in
parliament, and even half a year ago, one got the impression that the triumphal
march of the Ukrainian "Chavez with a braid" toward the presidential
office could not be stopped.
But
it was. Thanks to the people of Ukraine. Who, by the principle of "a
contrario," gave a slight preference to the boring and tongue-tied
Yanukovych. Not a great preference, but a preference nonetheless.
If Tymoshenko had won the 2010 elections, the powers of President and Prime
Minister of Ukraine would in fact have been concentrated in the same hands.
(Her trusted deputy and aide would have become the head of government). And the
political regime in Ukraine would soon have been transformed from
institutional-democratic to authoritarian-charismatic. Specifically of the
Chavez type. Anyone who has even a slight acquaintance with Tymoshenko and her
political history cannot have any doubts about this.
Thanks to the choice of the relative majority of the Ukrainian people, there
will not be any charismatic authoritarianism for now. Democracy will remain.
Among other things, because Ukrainian politics will continue to be polycentric.
Both Yanukovych and Tymoshenko will be retained in it, and their competition
will inevitably require democratic mechanisms and institutions.
So that, by their choice, the Ukrainian people defended democracy. Glory be to
them!
[2] Secondly.
The
departing president, Viktor Yushchenko, deserves many reproaches: For
exhibiting weakness, for his indecisiveness, and for his inability to be
friends and to value friendship. For the fact that he did not ensure economic
reforms, he may simply be torn to pieces.
But he also deserves some congratulations. For the fact that he had promised to
hold honest and free presidential elections. And he did so. Without trying to
latch on to power. He did not appoint himself as successor. He did not shoot up
parliament.
He guaranteed real freedom of speech - and today we have it in Ukraine.
He wanted foreign players not to intervene in Ukrainian politics in a major way
- and that is what happened. In all of the post-Soviet time, the 2010 elections
became the first at which that same Kremlin did not have a clear favorite, and
did not influence the result.
Viktor Yushchenko wanted to not allow Yuliya Tymoshenko to assume the office of
president, because he saw in her a source of authoritarian threat. And he did
not allow her to do so. So that Tymoshenko lost out not so much to Yanukovych,
as to Yushchenko. According to my initial estimates, were it not for the
departing head of state, Yuliya Vladimirovna would have received 7-8 percent
more votes, and would have become president. With all of the aforementioned
consequences.
So that we can and must curse Yushchenko, but we should not make him out to be
a worthless nothing and a pumpkin-headed oaf.
[3] Thirdly.
I do not
know how many poor, not rich and rich people voted for Yanukovych and Tymoshenko,
respectively. Maybe sociologists will soon tell us.
However, I know something else for sure: How the very rich acted. The Ukrainian
oligarchs.
Almost in their full complement, they came to the Kiev Intercontinental Hotel
on the night of 7-8 February, where a fatigued Yanukovych staff was seething
with uneasy victory. About half of those who came to pay homage to the winner
were sponsors of the Tymoshenko campaign, who had even quite recently placed
the stake on her success. But, as the old saying goes, the concept changed -
and they hastened to kiss the ring of the newly elected president.
To the outside observer, these richest people appeared belittled and pathetic.
But of course, they did not seem pathetic to themselves. After all, they had
come to protect their big money. And in order to protect big money, the
classical post-Soviet oligarch is ready to opt for any moral-political
sacrifices. If he has to dance naked on a table - he will dance.
And it is certainly not democracy, and certainly not the future of Ukraine that
worried the oligarchs at that same intercontinental moment.
In just the same way, in 2004 all of the very rich Ukrainians had placed their
stake on the programmed victory of Yanukovych. But then, during and especially
after Maydan, they ran to bow down to Yushchenko.
And it was certainly not the rich who staged the Maydan. Just as it was not the
rich who turned out for demonstrations in Moscow in 1990-91. And it was not the
rich who elected Yushchenko in 2004, and Yeltsin in 1989, 1990 and 1991.
However, the rich did elect Vladimir Putin. In 1999. So that he would protect
their interests. Against democracy. Which Putin successfully did.
The one whose political choice depends on money will never choose democracy. Because
money likes quiet. And quiet in this case is the antonym of freedom.
[4] Fourthly.
Viktor
Yanukovych is, of course, a very heavy passenger. His gloomy demeanor and his
total inability to speak are quite obvious. And by his tactical-technical characteristics,
he is, of course, no democrat. Although the victory which, at his own
admission, he had waited 5 years to achieve, he owes entirely to democracy. And
only to it.
After
all, he could have won in 2004 through falsifications - and he would have
become a semi-legitimate little third-world potentate. He could have agreed to
the ceremonial post of parliamentary president in coalition with Tymoshenko
last year - and he would have become Hindenburg under you-know-who.
The irony of Ukrainian history has proven the ultimate correctness of democracy
to Yanukovych.
Yanukovych bided his time, waited, went to fully democratic elections, and is
now the legitimate head of a free state. Barack Obama, Nicholas Sarcozy and
even Mikhail Saakashvili have already congratulated him. Vladimir Putin
(fortunately for Yanukovych!), unlike 2004, has not yet done so. (Remember the
anecdote: "Putin congratulated Yanukovych for the seventh time on his
victory in the elections, and also wished Yasser Arafat a speedy recovery.")
Yanukovych, of course, called Chekhov a Ukrainian poet, and Anna Akhmatova -
Anna Akhmetova. But he never beat his close aide Anna German, never called
protesters morons, never confused the gene fund with genocide, and never got
slapped in the face by Rinata Akhmetova. These are all political-technology
fabrications of a competing firm. Perhaps, partly even clever. But it is not
right to use them as facts and material for an honest analysis of present-day
Ukrainian politics.
[5] Fifth.
Let us
recall once again: In our Russia, the one who is in fact categorically opposed
to democracy has the honor of being called a democrat.
We pretend that we are dreaming of freedom. And that we hate usurpers.
But when we are shown how real freedom in fact operates, we turn up our noses.
Because freedom does not always - oh, not always - smell of perfume and cognac.
Because it often reeks of coastal deadwood, hobo pants and yesterday's garlic.
And then, right away, we do not need such freedom. It will probably lead us to
the wrong place.
Better to continue to curse the accursed Putin and his Petersburg siloviki
(security services officials). What the heck, that is so convenient.
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8.
STOP ALREADY WITH THE IS
UKRAINE TILTING EAST OR WEST OBSESSION
Analysis
& Commentary: By Nadia McConnell and Irene Jarosewich
Aha!
Network...Illuminating Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea Region
Washington, D.C., Friday, February 19, 2010
The myopic perspective of Western observers, analysts, and governments that the
politics and governance of Ukraine must be seen always through some sort of
Russia lens needs to come to an end. This tired, yet ingrained, starting point
precludes an accurate analysis of Ukraine’s current political situation and
retards the development of genuinely mature relations with Ukraine and, indeed,
the region.
While the West continues handwringing, the democratic process has taken hold in
Ukraine. The Ukrainian people are far ahead of their politicians in using the
democratic process to pursue the independent and successful country they
desire. The evidence is clear and consistent: the people of Ukraine, once free
and independent, have sought democracy and fully participate in contested
elections.
The
West needs to think outside the box into which Ukraine has been kept and
abandon the old predispositions that have metastasized as the West adjusted to
the breakup of the Soviet Union.
During the past 20 years, on each election day, a very high percentage of
eligible voters in Ukraine cast ballots. On February 7, more than 69 percent of
registered voters came out in frigid weather in what has been judged to be the
most fair and transparent election to date. As with previous elections,
analysis in the West gave only fleeting credit to the voters of Ukraine for
once again validating the democratic process.
Instead,
the analysis wallowed in the simplistic conundrum of whether or not this
election is a victory for the Kremlin, and a rejection of the allegedly U.S.
inspired and funded Orange Revolution.
The West must recognize that the people of Ukraine have already done the hard
work. They have reminded the world that the purpose of the Orange Revolution
was the victory of the democratic process, a vote fair and non-coerced, not
just the victory of a particular candidate. Repeatedly, Ukraine’s citizens have
proven with dogged commitment that they are making the transition from tyranny
to freedom.
How
many more election cycles is the West going to wait to see if Ukraine’s people
have made their choice in favor of democracy before it offers Ukraine steadfast
strategic support?
Unlike the West and Moscow, Ukraine’s voters are not obsessed with the East-West
struggle. Rather, information from recent surveys conducted by the U.S.-based
non-profit IFES indicate that the top three issues Ukrainian voters want the
next President to address are jobs (71%), reducing inflation (56%), and
reducing corruption (48%).
The
highly charged, politically sensitive issues most frequently addressed in
Russian and Western media are of much lower concern to the people of Ukraine:
the gas situation with Russia (17%), status of Russian language (9%), EU
relations (3%), and NATO relations (1%).
The
results in the recent presidential election were very close. Ukraine’s voters
gave Viktor Yanukovych 48.9 percent of the vote and Yulia
Tymoshenko, 45.4 percent. Indeed, in Ukraine, where ballots allow
the electorate to vote against all eligible candidates, almost five percent of
voters braved the weather specifically to vote against both Yanukovych and
Tymoshenko. Mr. Yanukovych’s rather thin margin of victory and the fact that he
did not receive a majority of all votes cast invites a deeper review.
In opinion surveys prior to the elections, both candidates received higher
disapproval than approval ratings. Yanukovych won despite having a negative
rating of 55 percent, Tymoshenko had a negative rating of 67 percent. The election
provided no solid mandate and clearly many voters cast their votes for a
candidate with whom they were not enamored.
The
totality of the election results show that Ukrainian voters are committed to
their responsibilities as citizens in a democracy, as well as discriminating in
their choices. Civil society in Ukraine is maturing fundamentally and
politicians in Ukraine, and the West, ignore this maturing constituency at
their peril.
In the near future, the United States will welcome Ukraine’s new president,
Viktor Yanukovych, to Washington. The exact date of such a visit and if the new
president will be accorded an official State visit or a working visit is
unknown. To demonstrate the respect and understanding of the United States for
Ukraine’s strategic importance to the West, the visit should be of the highest
level.
However,
regardless of the type of visit, there is no doubt that President Yanukovych
will make a stop at a small plaza at 22nd and P streets in Northwest
Washington. He will then do that which every official from Ukraine has done,
political party or personal past notwithstanding: he will lay flowers and make
a speech at the foot of the monument to poet Taras Shevchenko, an undisputed
icon and hero of Ukraine.
Who
was Shevchenko? Why is a visit to his monument near 22nd and P streets
obligatory for all Ukrainians who come to Washington?
Taras
Shevchenko was born a serf in Ukraine in 1814 and orphaned as a child. When he
was 24, artists and poets who recognized his tremendous talents and creative
gifts bought Shevchenko his freedom. He was welcomed into the highest creative
and academic circles in his country and within St. Petersburg and Moscow as a
poet, writer, painter, extraordinary visionary and thinker.
He
established friendships with intellectual leaders from throughout the Russian
Empire and Europe. However, after only seven years of freedom, Shevchenko was
sent into exile for writing against the tyranny of the Russian tsars and for
protesting the enslavement of Ukraine. A prolific writer, Shevchenko was
forbidden to write or paint by direct order of the tsar.
Shevchenko,
a humanist and an unflinching defender of freedom, opposed tyranny, serfdom and
enslavement and continues to be celebrated by the people of Ukraine, as well as
internationally. Outside of Ukraine, he has been honored with more than 600
monuments in more than 22 countries. Taras Shevchenko was not anti-Russian. He
was Ukrainian, a Ukrainian who spoke with hope about the possibilities of his
beloved country’s future.
So, if he walks to the side of the monument, Mr. Yanukovych will find the
following inscription, in Ukrainian: “When will Ukraine have its Washington
with fair and just laws? Someday we will!”
In our nation’s capital, these words are etched on a monument. Yet in
Ukraine, since Shevchenko first wrote these words in 1857, they have been
etched on people’s souls. These words still express, unequivocally, eloquently
and directly, the goal of the people of Ukraine and help give context to Ukraine’s
civil society today. Not only do Ukraine’s elected leaders need to pay
attention, it is time also for the West to get the message.
The West must judge Ukraine on its own merits. Active support should be
provided for the new president’s stated objective for Ukraine and Russia to
have cordial relations, yet for Ukraine to set its own course. Since Ukraine
cannot change its geography, good relations with neighbors are imperative.
However, Bonn, Brussels, and Washington need to cast aside their fear that
Ukraine pursuing separate interests from Russia is a threat, just because
Moscow claims it is a threat.
Now
that Western capitals have what pre-election analysis claimed is a pro-Russia,
or at least a Russia-neutral, president in Ukraine, a president who will not
inconvenience Western relations with Russia, it is time to offer Ukraine, and
its people their due and actively support the further development of civil
society and thereby encourage the improved functioning of a democratic state.
The people of Ukraine understand that in order for their country to become
political and economically stable, the prevalence of widespread corruption has
to be eliminated. The West must help the people of Ukraine receive their fair
and just laws. We need to help Ukraine’s maturing civil society develop the
political mechanisms to help keep political officials accountable.
When
a country seeks to transform itself from a dictatorship into a democracy,
making sincere and consistent efforts to emulate our values, we should support
these efforts with conviction, regardless of what their neighbors think.
NOTE: Nadia McConnell is the president of the
Washington-based U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF) and Co-Founder of the
Baltic-Black-Caspian-Sea Initiative. Irene Jarosewich, a New York-based
writer and editor, has been a consultant with the U.S.-Ukraine Foundation
(USUF) for two decades.
LINK:
http://ahanetwork.org/
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Monitoring Service]
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9.
NARROW YANUKOVYCH VICTORY
IN UKRAINE ELECTION
FOLLOWED BY CONTINUING STRUGGLE
ANALYSIS:
OSC, US Open Source Center
Washington, D.C., Wed, February 17, 2010
Ukrainian
opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych narrowly edged out Premier Yuliya
Tymoshenko in the 7 February Ukrainian presidential election runoff and quickly
said he wanted to remove Tymoshenko as premier. Tymoshenko challenged the
election results, alleging fraud in Yanukovych's home oblast of Donetsk and
elsewhere, and declared her determination to keep her post as premier.
Bitterness
between Tymoshenko and Yanukovych appears to be growing, but Yanukovych's weak
election showing and the difficulty of forming a majority in the Rada led some
observers to speculate he may have to make a deal with Tymoshenko, keeping her
on as premier in return for her recognition of his election and for her party's
support in the Rada.
More
likely is a deal with outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko's Nasha Ukrayina
faction, but some suggest any scenario -- a Yanukovych-Tymoshenko compromise, a
coalition between Yanukovych and Yushchenko, or even a new Rada election -- is
unlikely to end instability.
Although running 10 points ahead of Tymoshenko in the 17 January first round,
Yanukovych only ecked out a 3 point margin in the 7 February runoff, even
falling short of 50% (Cvk.gov.ua). (1)
Candidate First Round--votes Percentage Runoff--votes Percentage
Yanukovych
8,686,751
35.32%
12,480,053
48.96%
Tymoshenko
6,159,829
25.05%
11,589,638
45.47%
margin
2,526,922
890,415
Neither candidate reached 50%, as 4.36% of voters voted against both. (In the
first round, 2.2% voted against all candidates (Cvk.gov.ua). (2)) The highest
"against all" vote in the runoff was in Kyiv city, with 8%
(Ukrayinska Pravda, 7 February). (3)
Yanukovych won by rolling up bigger margins in the east and south than
Tymoshenko could roll up in the west and center. Yanukovych margin
Tymoshenko margin
In the east
5,252,774
In the west
3,400,470
In the south
1,879,051
In the center
2,828,995
Total (east and south)
7,131,825
Total (west and center)
6,229,465
Yanukovych's victory was based on an overwhelming margin (over 90%) in his home
oblast of Donetsk -- Ukraine's biggest oblast -- and neighboring Luhansk
(almost 89%) -- a 3,392,000 margin.
Oblast Yanukovych Percentage Tymoshenko Percentage Margin
Donetsk
2,435,522
90.44%
173,820
6.45%
2,261,702
Luhansk
1,237,922
88.96%
107,523
7.72%
1,130,399
Total
3,673,444
281,343
3,392,101
Yanukovych's victory in other eastern oblasts was not as lopsided: 62.7% in Dnipropetrovsk,
71.5% in Zaporizhzhya, and 71.35% in Kharkiv. The five eastern oblasts together
have about 33% of the total national vote and with the south (Crimea,
Sevastopol, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson) make up almost 47% of the national
electorate. Result Reinforces East-West Split
Yanukovych's inability to get many votes in the west (he won only 6% --
794,416) and dependence on the east and south (74% of his vote) reinforced
Ukraine's east-west split, as western Ukrainians still refused to vote for him.
Yanukovych had to win by the weight of the overwhelming margin of votes in the
populous east. In some districts in Donetsk he got over 93%. (a)
In the runoff, Yanukovych raised his 35% in the first round to near 49%, adding
3,793,302 votes to his first round 8,686,000, but this was mainly by adding
votes from the east (1,831,000). He only attracted an additional 230,000 votes
from the west in the runoff. Tymoshenko Camp Alleges Falsification, Won't
Recognize Results
Tymoshenko and her party leaders refused to recognize Yanukovych's victory,
alleging widespread vote fraud in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea.
On 8 February, she told a closed meeting of her faction that "I will never
recognize the legitimacy of Yanukovych's victory in such an election" and
that she had ordered lawyers to prepare to dispute the results in court
(Ukrayinska Pravda, 8 February). (4) She said she would seek invalidation of
the runoff and holding of a third round, as in the 2004 presidential election,
arguing that "in the second round in 2004 the gap between Yanukovych and
Yushchenko also was 900,000, but today we encountered falsification which I
didn't even see then" (Ukrayinska Pravda, 10 February). (5)
After several days of public silence, on 13 February she gave a TV speech
taking a hard stand, flatly declaring the election fraudulent and that she will
never recognize Yanukovych's election. She said she has been "gathering
evidence" and "working with lawyers" and "today I can
firmly say to you that the election in Ukraine was falsified." She cited
Crimea, where with the help of the courts her representatives were able to get
a recount and "we were shocked by the fact that in all, without exception,
polling stations it was legally established that there was falsification of from
3% to 8% in favor of Yanukovych."
She
said that for Ukraine as a whole falsification may involve over a million
votes. She said she would not call crowds to the streets, as in 2004, but would
fight in the courts. "But I want to precisely state that Yanukovych is not
our president and no matter how future events turn, he will never become the
legitimately elected president of the country" (Podrobnosti.ua, 14
February). (6)
Her close ally, Deputy Premier and head of her election staff Oleksandr Turchynov,
said her party would challenge the results in Donetsk, especially at polling
stations where her representatives were allegedly excluded (ITAR-TASS, 7
February). (7) Turchynov alleged Yanukovych's Party of Regions took total
control of three districts in Donetsk (41, 42, 62), where local officials
rejected the election representatives selected by her party (UNIAN, 7
February). (8)
The
Party of Regions, for its part, accused Tymoshenko of trying to disrupt the
elections in Donetsk by having her representatives on local election
commissions not show up for the elections (ITAR-TASS, 7 February) (9) and
therefore 2,905 of her representatives -- mostly western Ukrainians -- were
being replaced by others in Donetsk to avoid disruption (Interfax-Ukraine, 5 February).
(10) Turchynov demanded a recount in 1,200 districts and said that a recount in
7 districts had turned up 5-8% falsified votes for Yanukovych (Glavred, 12
February). (11)
BYuT (Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko) Rada deputy Sergey Vlasenko said BYuT will
demand a recount at all polling stations in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea
(ITAR-TASS, 10 February), (12) while BYuT deputy Andriy Senchenko asserted that
a fourth of the votes for Yanukovych in Crimea were falsified, up to 200,000
votes (Ukrayinska Pravda, 11 February). (13) Tymoshenko Determined To Keep Post
of Premier
Although Yanukovych stated that he expects to replace Tymoshenko as premier,
she has repeatedly insisted she will not resign, arguing the constitution does
not require a change of government after election of a new president.
Yanukovych immediately after the election called on Tymoshenko to recognize
defeat and also to resign as premier, to allow a new government to be formed.
In a message on his website, Yanukovych said "I call on the premier to
resign and move into opposition ...to enable me to start negotiations with
various factions regarding formation of a new cabinet" (Kanal 5, 10
February). (14)
Party of Regions deputy head Anna Herman called on BYuT to recognize that
"the resignation of the Tymoshenko government is unavoidable"
(Glavred, 12 February). (15)
After Tymoshenko's hardline 13 February speech, Yanukovych said her past poor
work left her "no chances to stay at this post" (ITAR-TASS, 14
February). (16)
However, Tymoshenko and her associates declared she had no intention of
resigning.
Turchynov declared: "There are no grounds for the government to resign on
its own initiative" (ITAR-TASS, 11 February), (17) and BYuT deputy Andriy
Shkil said Tymoshenko would remain premier until a new coalition is formed in
the Rada that can approve a new premier, "but now we see no grounds for
resignation" (Obkom, 10 February). (18)
Tymoshenko demonstrated her determination to keep her post as premier by
appealing on 16 February to Yushchenko's Nasha Ukrayina and Rada Speaker
Volodymyr Lytvyn's Bloc to continue their coalition with her BYuT and thereby
prevent Yanukovych forming a new coalition to install a new premier. Meeting
with the Nasha Ukrayina faction, she continued to insist that she does not have
to resign unless or until Yanukovych can form a majority to approve a new
premier (Interfax, (19) ITAR-TASS, 16 February (20)). (b)
According to the constitution, the cabinet is to resign when a new president is
elected, however the cabinet continues in office until a new premier is
approved by a majority in the Rada. Therefore, Tymoshenko would continue until
Yanukovych can form a new coalition (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 February). (21)
Politcom.ru observer Igor Bunin pointed out the difficulty of forming a new
coalition since it must be formed of factions, not of individual defectors from
factions.
While
the 172 Party of Regions deputies could join with the 27 Communists and 20
Lytvyn Bloc deputies to get near the 226 required for a majority, stray
defectors from Yushchenko's Nasha Ukrayina or Tymoshenko's BYuT would not meet
the requirements and a decision to join as a group by one of these two factions
would be needed (Politcom.ru, 15 February). (22)
Yanukovych May Need To Compromise With Tymoshenko
With
Yanukovych's weak electoral victory and the difficulties of cobbling together a
majority in the Rada to replace Tymoshenko, some observers, even Russians,
suggested that Yanukovych may find it necessary to compromise with Tymoshenko,
perhaps even leaving her as premier.
Ukrainian observer Volodymyr Fesenko stated that "no one's presidency in
Ukraine ever began in such complicated circumstances" and so Yanukovych
"must reconsider his views and seek compromise with Tymoshenko" to avoid
the risk that his victory "remains unrecognized by half the country"
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 February). (23)
Russian observer Oleg Gorbunov wrote that Yanukovych's narrow victory raises
various problems and that "apparently the solution is achieving a
compromise between the main political forces in the country, primarily between
BYuT and the Party of Regions" (Politcom.ru, 11 February). (24)
Russian observer Vitaliy Portnikov wrote that it will take time to form a new
coalition and oust Tymoshenko as premier and holding a new parliamentary
election does not guarantee Yanukovych a new majority. "So, perhaps, one
should reach agreement with Tymoshenko, trade her recognition of the results of
the presidential election for a 'grand coalition'" with her. Portnikov
asked "isn't this what the premier is striving for? So, as they say,
Tymoshenko cannot lose" (Politcom.ru, 11 February).
Moscow observer Avtandil Tsuladze argued that the "minimal gap between
Tymoshenko and Yanukovych ... rules out the situation under which the winner
gets all." Yanukovych has to "overcome the split in the country"
and "this is possible in only one case -- if Tymoshenko remains as premier
under President Yanukovych." (Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, 9 February). (25)
Prominent Ukrainian political commentator Mykhaylo Pohrebinskyy declared
Yanukovych is in a no less complicated situation than the loser Tymoshenko:
"Every day he calls on Tymoshenko to resign from the post of premier --
this is already comical. She does not leave, and he cannot get rid of her --
for this he needs the agreement of a parliamentary majority not only to vote
for her removal but to approve a new composition of the government."
Moscow
daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that analysts feel that under these
conditions Tymoshenko may remain premier for at least a half year and although
she has no real chance of disputing the election results, "she still can
drive Yanukovych into a corner" where he has no Rada majority and
"risks winding up in political isolation like Yushchenko did."
Pohrebinskyy
argued there is just one solution -- "agreement to collaborate."
Adding his voice, outgoing President Yushchenko on 16 February stated that if
Yanukovych guaranteed Tymoshenko the post of premier, she would end her court
challenges to the election result (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 February). (26)
Yanukovych will apparently have to reach beyond his Party of Regions in
choosing a new premier in order to add enough deputies to form a majority.
Although most Nasha Ukrayina deputies at present seem inclined to stick with
Tymoshenko (UNIAN, 16 February), (27) some suggest naming a Nasha Ukrayina
premier like Yuriy Yekhanurov or an acceptable neutral like Serhiy Tihipko
could incline them to join a coalition with the Party of Regions (Obkom, 16
February; (28) Interfax, 9 February (29)).
But some observers argued that with the continuing divisions in Ukraine,
instability will continue in any case.
Russian observer Igor Bunin concluded that "whatever scenario of events
develops in Ukraine -- whether creation of a coalition with the participation
of Nasha Ukrayina and appointment of a compromise premier or an early (Rada)
election -- any variant keeps a situation of political instability for a long
time in Ukraine" (Politcom.ru, 15 February). (30)
Ukrainian website From-ua argued that the president's power is limited, as
President Yushchenko's extended struggles with his premiers (Tymoshenko and
Yanukovych) showed, and so "if Ukrainian voters think that with the
conclusion of the presidential election the country has entered peace and
quiet, they are deeply mistaken. The war for power continues, and the most
scandalous scenes await us in the future" (From-ua, 12 February).
(31) [Footnotes not included here]
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10.
PUTIN SHOULD BEWARE OF
KIEV POLL AFTERTASTE
Analysis
& Commentary: By Stefan Wagstyl in London
Financial
Times, London, UK, Tue, Feb 16, 2010
For Vladimir Putin the results of the Ukrainian presidential election are
sweet. But the Russian prime minister should savour the success of Viktor Yanukovich
with some care - there may yet be a strange aftertaste.
At first lick, there should be nothing to disturb Mr Putin. President Viktor
Yushchenko, Kiev's pro-west champion, has been comprehensively beaten, losing
in the first round with barely 5 per cent of the vote - a humiliation for the
Nato-supporting Orange Revolution hero.
Mr Yanukovich, who overcame the glamorous Yulia Tymoshenko in Sunday's final
round, is the most Russia-friendly of the top candidates, even if his
sympathies are outweighed by dependence on his real masters, Ukraine's
industrial billionaires.
To add spice for Mr Putin, this is the same Mr Yanukovich who lost in 2004 when
he was Moscow's publicly backed candidate. The gaffe-prone former convict is
not exactly the ex-KGB colonel's best mate. But he owes the Kremlin a few
favours.
Mr Yanukovich's victory will probably not mark any dramatic Russia-oriented
shift in foreign policy. The big change came in 2008, when Nato decided against
extending membership to Ukraine (or Georgia) for fear of offending Russia. The
point was rammed home during the Georgia war. For Mr Yushchenko, who had
earlier discovered that the European Union did not want Ukraine as a member
either, it was the end of a dream.
Subsequently, Kiev took a more balanced approach. With Mr Yushchenko in
retreat, Ms Tymoshenko, as prime minister, developed relations with Mr Putin at
the same time as promoting EU integration. With Mr Yanukovich there will be a
bit more Russia in the mix but the two-track policy will remain in place.
But beneath the surface there are hidden dangers for Mr Putin. The most
important challenge of the Orange Revolution was not the threat of Ukraine
breaking away from Moscow and joining the west. That was unlikely, given the
myriad ties between the two countries. And if events ever had moved in that
direction, Russia had powerful tools at its disposal, such as fomenting
separatism in Crimea.
What really disturbed Mr Putin was the Orange Revolution's potential political
impact within Russia. It was a democratic challenge, albeit indirect, to his
authoritarian structures. With protesters overthrowing leaders at around the
same time in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, it was possible to believe liberalisation
was sweeping the former Soviet Union - and that the ultimate target could be
Russia.
In the event, the new regime in Kyrgyzstan proved little different from the
old. In Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, the president, allowed himself to be
drawn into a disastrous war. In Ukraine, as Mr Putin never ceased to point out,
the Orange Revolution was followed by chaos.
The circumstances of the Orange Revolution - the protests, the blatant foreign
involvement by Russia and the west and the subsequent turmoil - made it easy
for Moscow to portray democracy as a mess. But this time it could be different.
If Mr Yanukovich can create a stability - a big if - and generate economic
recovery - an even bigger if - it will be harder for Mr Putin to argue Russia
has nothing to learn from Ukraine.
This is not an issue for today. Even though Russians are angry with the
recessionand some blame the authorities for their woes, there are no serious
threats to Mr Putin's grip on power. Recent demonstrations in the Kaliningrad
region and sporadic protests elsewhere do not change the picture. And no one
looks to Kiev for advice.
But who knows about the future? Mr Putin and his protégé, President Dmitry
Medvedev, do not run a totalitarian state but an authoritarian system in which
some argument is tolerated. Every so often, there is a note of real dissent.
Last
week, Sergei Mironov, speaker of the federation council (parliament's upper
house), attacked the government's economic policies and was promptly slapped
down by Mr Putin's United Russia party. He retorted: "Does United Russia think
that opposition and criticism is dishonest? In a civilised society, this is the
duty and aim of the opposition."
Could Ukraine one day serve as an example of such a "civilised
society", even in Russian eyes?
LINK:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a256f91e-1a99-11df-bef7-00144feab49a.html
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U.S.-Ukraine Business Council (USUBC): http://www.usubc.org
Promoting U.S.-Ukraine business relations & investment since
1995.
========================================================
11. GORBACHEV HOPES YANUKOVICH TO OVERCOME AMERICAN
FACTOR
Itar-Tass,
Moscow, Russia, Sat, Feb 13, 2010
MOSCOW -
Leader of Ukraine's Regions Party Viktor Yanukovich, who won the runoff
presidential election last Sunday, will obviously neutralize the 'American
factor' in Ukrainian politics, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev said
Saturday.
As he spoke in an interview with the Rossiya Channel prime-time news and
analysis program, he made it clear he believes that the U.S. exerts a decisive
impact on the situation in Ukraine.
"I think they /the Americans/ will find it increasingly more
difficult," Gorbachev said. "If the Ukrainians were do decide things
on their own, they would certainly pursue the policy of leveling out the
relations with Russia."
He believes relations between the countries like Russia and Ukraine should be
free of any major problems. "There exist two well-shaped countries, Russia
and Ukraine," Gorbachev said. "They have border, on which everyone
has agreed, and so let's live normally and do all the rest on the basis of
agreements."
He admitted that the restoration of the Soviet Union is impossible now and
added that he "was glad when the idea appeared of setting up a common
economic space comprising Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan."
These four countries account for 80% of the former USSR's economic potential,
and "that's quite enough," Gorbachev said. "Still, very many
people wouldn't like to see Russia and Ukraine's unification," he said.
"Let's begin with the U.S. to avoid enumerating all the
rest."
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12. UKRAINE'S OUTGOING PRESIDENT WARNS OF TURN EAST
Associated
Press (AP), Kiev, Ukraine, Tue, February 16, 2010
KIEV, Ukraine Outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko said Tuesday the policies
of his newly elected successor risk turning Ukraine back into a Kremlin vassal
state.
Yushchenko made the statements, some of his harshest against President-elect
Viktor Yanukovych, at a news conference nine days before he is due hand over
power. "The victory of Yanukovych is a Kremlin project. It is a
policy of deep dependence on Russia," Yushchenko said.
Yushchenko was the leader of mass street protests in 2004 against Yanukovych's
Kremlin-backed election victory that year. Dubbed the Orange Revolution, those
demonstrations urged the Supreme Court to overturn Yanukovych's fraudulent win
and call for a revote, which Yushchenko won.
Since then, Yanukovych has capitalized on Yushchenko's ineffectual rule, the
slow progress of European integration, and the economic meltdown of the past
year. He won the presidential ballot Feb. 7 against the heroine of the Orange
Revolution, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
Yushchenko saved particular venom for Yanukovych's plans to give Russia a stake
in managing Ukraine's natural gas pipelines and to extend the lease Russia has
on a Black Sea naval base.
"It is painful and demeaning for me to hear these pledges. It discredits
us as a nation, as Ukrainians," Yushchenko told a sparsely attended
briefing, appearing dejected but calm.
Yushchenko has fought bitterly to kick out Russia's Black Sea fleet, which he
sees as a threatening military presence on Ukrainian soil. He called
Yanukovych's pledge to allow the fleet to stay a "policy of being
colonized."
In a statement, Yanukovych responded to Yushchenko's attack with a pledge to
pursue a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy. "I can only say one thing
to anyone who expects my presidency to weaken Ukraine don't count on
it," Yanukovych said.
AUR FOOTNOTE: These are interesting
comments by President Yushchenko as most seasoned election observers say
Yushchenko played a major role in Yanukovych's victory over PM
Tymoshenko through Yushchenko's constant and major attacks on PM
Tymoshenko over the past two years and by his reported urging voters to
mark on the presidential ballot, 'none of the above.'
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13.
BULGAKOV IS ONCE AGAIN
OUR GUIDE TO UKRAINE
Analysis & Commentary: By Misha Glenny
Financial
Times, London, UK, Fri, Feb 12 2010
If you are struggling to make sense of the latest twists in Ukraine's political
drama, you could do worse than book tickets for the new adaptation of The White
Guard at London's National Theatre. Set in the Kiev of 1918, Mikhail Bulgakov's
masterpiece reveals the terminal pain of the Turbins, a likeable if flawed
White Russian family sinking steadily under the weight of the violent
ideological conflict that wracked the Ukrainian capital during the Russian
civil war.
When
the play first appeared on the London stage more than 30 years ago, the Kiev it
depicted was unrecognisable. After 50 years of Soviet rule, Ukraine bore all
the hallmarks of East European communism. If you kept your opinions to
yourself, nothing untoward would befall you. Equally, nothing interesting ever
happened - a land of lotus eaters without the druginduced contentment.
So
although a brilliant production, the White Guard of the 1970s did not speak to
contemporary Ukraine - it was a domestic tragedy interrupted by noises
off-stage as long-forgotten hordes of Ukrainian nationalists, Russian
Bolsheviks, Cossacks and Germans sought to conquer Kiev.
But
current events in Ukraine make the National Theatre's new production seem
relevant and timely. I recently re-read the novel on which it was based and it
struck me that it has been transformed into a biting satire of the country's
fundamental resistance to rational governance. Trainloads of cash, thieving
retinues and serial turncoats remind us of how Ukraine's oligarchs and
interfering outsiders have turned the place into a land of permanent discord,
money-grabbing and duplicity.
After
the victory of the Orange Revolution in 2004, Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia
Tymoshenko had an unprecedented opportunity to lift Ukraine out of the
post-Soviet sump. But despite a huge popular mandate and enthusiastic western
backing, it took only a few months before the two darlings of the Orange
Revolution were channelling their political energies into a personal vendetta
as vindictive as anything that the Bolsheviks or Ukrainian nationalists cooked
up in The White Guard.
Of
the two Orange leaders, Ms Tymoshenko, a billionaire oligarch known also as
"the gas princess", has proved the most adroit in adapting to
changing circumstances. During her first stint as prime minister, Vladimir
Putin threatened Ms Tymoshenko with arrest if she dared set foot in Moscow.
But
more recently, she and Mr Putin publicly buried the hatchet - much to everyone
else's relief, as the reconciliation averted yet another crisis in the
perennially troubled issue of how much Ukraine should pay for Russian gas (in
fact, these gas disputes concern the distribution of kickbacks to oligarchs and
politicians from both countries).
But
in Kiev, it seems the bitter intransigence of the White Guard -era still rules.
The new president, Viktor Yanukovich, has already used his mandate to demand Ms
Tymoshenko's resignation as prime minister to avoid the now familiar problem of
gridlock in government. She in turn is insisting on a recount in the
presidential election, although there is a domestic and international consensus
that this was a free and fair democratic process (the one unambiguously
positive legacy of the Orange Revolution).
This
early spat is disappointing. Yet if we set aside the less appealing aspects of
the new president's track record, such as the criminal convictions, there are
few indications that Mr Yanukovich intends to transform Ukraine into a Russian
vassal, as some of his critics claim.
The
brains and purse behind the new president is the great mining oligarch of the
Donetsk region, Rinat Akhmetov. From a family of Tatars who escaped Stalin's
mass deportation in 1944, Mr Akhmetov can stand back from the country's
debilitating struggle between its two constituent Slav nations, the Ukrainians
and Russians.
It
is a pity that the two most powerful oligarchs, Ms Tymoshenko and Mr Akhmetov,
cannot set aside their differences. As the country's most enterprising
political figures, they could help turn Ukraine into a bridge (and a lucrative
one at that) between the European Union and Russia. But as long as the venal
infighting continues, The White Guard will remain as relevant as it was 83
years ago when it first took Moscow's theatre audiences by storm.
NOTE:
The writer is author of "McMafia: Journey through the Global Criminal
Underworld."
LINK:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b99d15e-1775-11df-87f6-00144feab49a.html
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14.
UKRAINE'S RADICALLY
DIFFERENT CONFLICT
Letter-to-the-Editor,
From Dr. Igor Torbakov
RE:
'Bulgakov is once again our guide to Ukraine' by Misha Glenny
Financial
Times, London, UK, February 20 2010
HELSINKI - Sir, Much as it is
tempting to link London’s National Theatre’s new production of Mikhail
Bulgakov’s The White Guard with Ukraine’s present-day chaotic politics, Misha
Glenny misses the point (“Bulgakov is once again our guide to Ukraine”,
February 12).
In the Kiev of 1918, Bulgakov was witnessing the unprecedented social upheaval
born of the collapse of the Romanov empire and the Russian revolution. At the
heart of it was the violent struggle between various political forces over the
scope of social transformation and over how to define Ukraine as a political
entity. It is utterly misleading to contend that the messy politics that we are
witnessing today is a kind of repetition of the 1918-19 events.
Today
in Ukraine we are observing radically different social conflicts. Mr Glenny
errs when he sees at the centre of the current political battle the
“debilitating struggle between its two constituent Slav nations, the Ukrainians
and Russians”.
True,
the ethno-linguistic cleavages in Ukraine still exist but the almost
20-year-long period of independence saw the slow emergence of common identity
comprising all Ukrainian citizens in one multi-ethnic Ukrainian political
nation. The struggle that is going on in Ukraine is not the one between
“Russian east” and “Ukrainian west.”
What
is really at stake is which social model will ultimately prevail in Ukraine: a
polity based on crony capitalism and oligarchic domination of political sphere,
or a highly institutionalised and law-governed state of a European type.
I,
as an enthusiastic Bulgakov fan, would suggest that Mr Glenny could do worse
than look for an updated list of sources helping to make sense of Ukraine's
tangled political process.
Igor
Torbakov, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland
LINK:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cdeabd0e-1dbe-11df-9e98-00144feab49a.html
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Ukraine Macroeconomic Report From
SigmaBleyzer:
http://www.sigmableyzer.com/index.php?action=publications
========================================================
15. UKRAINE'S
ELECTION: NO CHANGE WE CAN ENTIRELY BELIEVE IN
Commentary
& Analysis: Wayne Merry, Senior Associate
American
Foreign Policy Council (AFPC)
AFPC
Blog, Washington, D.C., Tue, Feb 16, 2010
The best commentary on Ukraine's presidential election outcome I have heard is
from a colleague with lots of experience in the country and region: For ten
years, Ukraine has been a disappointment to the West; now it is Russia's turn.
Many commentators think Moscow somehow "won" in Ukraine. Certainly,
Russian interests did not lose, but that would have been the case with
Tymoshenko.
Some
tangible Russian goals may be advanced, but in general, the Russian leadership
may come to appreciate why there is so much "Ukraine fatigue" in
Washington, in Brussels and other European capitals.
[1] First, Ukraine is a mess. It inherited all
the problems of other former Soviet states.
[2] Its demographics are, amazingly, even worse than Russia's.
[3] Agriculture still suffers the legacy of collectivization;
[4] industry remains pretty much the step child of central planning;
[5] infrastructure is (how else can one put it?) Soviet.
[6] Ukraine is the most energy inefficient economy (BTUs per unit GDP) on
Earth.
Certainly,
there have been many positive changes in the past couple of decades, but like
Belarus, Moldova and Russia itself, Ukraine suffers from seven decades of
catastrophic bad policies. The political crisis of the past five years since
the so-called "Orange Revolution" has seen progress in some important
areas (legitimate elections are not small potatoes in that part of the world),
but inertia pretty much across the board. Not an exciting time to be young and
Ukrainian.
Next, Yanukovich will hardly be a strong leader and will need to compromise all
the time just to maintain some kind of coalition in the Rada. Yanukovich pretty
much came back from the political dead of four years ago, but he owes many
people for his resurrection, and they will want the debts paid, big time.
Politics
in Kyiv may be more effective than in recent years (how could they be worse?),
but this is nothing like the kind of new start and new authority which Putin
exercised ten years ago. In any case, Yanukovich is not Putin. He has lost some
weight and got a better wardrobe, but he is still nobody's idea of an inspiring
leader.
He
is smart enough, however, to know he must not be overly and overtly in Moscow's
pocket. He remembers how former President Leonid Kuchma confounded expectations
by maintaining a balance between Europe and Russia, and almost certainly will
do likewise.
Then, the fact remains that most Ukrainians even those who speak only Russian
want Ukraine to remain independent of Russia both in name and in fact. Those
in Moscow who envision a voluntary anschluss are dreaming. Even the big eastern
Ukrainian oligarchs who bankrolled Yanukovich think of themselves as European,
and certainly do not want to be junior-league Russian oligarchs.
These
guys have their luxury properties in Vienna, London and the south of France,
and want acceptance of themselves and their country as part of Europe broadly
defined, and not as provincial Russia.
Moscow can take gratification on some things.
[1] First, Viktor Yushchenko has exited the
political stage. In recent years, the departing Ukrainian president has
alienated all but his most stalwart supporters, and provoked rumors that the
poison which disfigured his face also damaged his mind. The man has long had
something of a messiah complex, but his behavior became not only erratic but
profoundly damaging for the most basic interests of his country.
In
the first round of the presidential election, Yushchenko had traction only in
areas which had once been Hapsburg. Indeed, his conduct had come to resemble
that of Charles II, the last of the Spanish Hapsburgs. If Yanukovich has anyone
to thank for his fairly narrow second-round victory, it is Yushchenko.
[2] Second, NATO membership
for Ukraine is a dead issue for years to come, but in reality it already was
because the people of the country decisively do not want it. It may very well
come to pass that Ukrainian cooperation with NATO within Partnership for Peace
may increase, as the question of MAP status is now off the table. Certainly,
Ukraine will pursue the best ties it can get with the European Union, enjoying
the advantage of WTO membership (still on the horizon for Russia).
[3] Third, a base deal on
Sevastopol which meets Russia's requirements is likely, but the broader
question of Crimea remains, and this is a question on which no Ukrainian leader
can compromise.
Finally, elections change politicians but not underlying realities. The Ukraine
which emerged from the Soviet collapse is the widest country in Europe, both in
geography and in political culture. Any government in Kyiv with good sense must
balance not only the country's external west/east orientation but its internal
west/central/south/east composition. Ukraine ultimately can never again belong
to Russia because Russia has lost its legitimacy as Slavic hegemon.
Neither
can Ukraine belong to the Europe of the EU because it remains part of the
eastern Slavic world with its legacy of Soviet and pre-Soviet history. The
proper task of the new Ukrainian leadership is to ameliorate the burdens of its
inhabitants rather than to play (or be played) in geo-strategic games. Moscow
may find a less adversarial Ukraine is still more liability than asset.
LINK:
http://www.afpc.org/app/webroot/blog/?p=92
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16. COULD PARTITION SOLVE UKRAINE'S PROBLEMS?
Analysis & Commentary: By Ethan S. Burger
Open Democracy, London, UK, Fri, February 19, 2010
Ethan S. Burger has been following events in the Soviet Union and its successor
states for over 20 years. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center.
In the light of Ukraine's election result, Ethan S. Burger offers a proposal
for the creation of a new Ukrainian state. Partition would do more than better
reflect the country's national/ethnic composition, he suggests. It could also
make the country economically viable, while enhancing European stability.
What of Ukraine's future now? The country's Central Election Commission has
announced that the leader of the Party of the Regions Viktor Yanukovich has
been elected president in the second round of voting. Despite Prime
Minister Yulia Timoshenko's claims to the contrary, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has announced the elections to be
fair.
However,
the election outcome will not be confirmed until Ukraine's Administrative Court
concludes its examination of Ms. Yulia Tymoshenko claim that the Election
Commission's official "results" are invalid. The Court's
determination should be issued prior to February 25th, when the new Ukrainian
President is to be inaugurated.
The Ukrainian economy is in terrible shape. Loans and technical assistance from
the European Union, international organizations and the United States have had
a very limited economic impact on a country plagued by corruption. Much of
the Ukrainian population is suffering financially.
The last two Ukrainian presidential elections suggest how strong a role
national identity appears to play in determining voting behaviour. Last Sunday,
as in 2004, Viktor Yanukovich received a majority of votes in Eastern Ukraine,
where most of the population has a closer affinity to Russia than to Western
Europe.
Western Ukraine used to be referred to as "New Russia," in
recognition of the fact that these lands were only added to the Russian Empire
through conquest in the 17th and 18th centuries. With respect to political
attitudes, the majority here seem to hold views which are closer to those of
Poles than Russians. Still, the Russian/Ukrainian linguistic/national
distribution in the country is not uniform.
The issue of self-identity is complex. But it is no accident that Mr.
Yanukovich has more appeal to Ukrainian citizens of Russian national origin
than does Ms. Timoshenko, the catalyst behind the so-called Orange Revolution,
which has disappointed popular expectations.
Collective nouns and generalizations can be misleading. It is
indisputable that Ukraine has a complex ethnology. No less than 17% of
Ukraine's population are of Russian national origin and are primarily
Russian-speaking. A fair segment of the population is either bilingual, or
ethnically mixed (usually with one parent who considers themselves
"Russian" and the other "Ukrainian"). These people tend not
to see the choice of language as a political issue so much as a means of
communication.
In Western Ukraine, the majority are Ukrainian speaking. While they may
understand Russian and speak it when necessary , they tend to see the
preservation of Ukrainian culture, history and language as a priority. In
addition, Ukraine has other nationalities such as Crimean Tatars, Greeks and
others.
Still, it would be a mistake to assume that nationality was a decisive factor
in the recent electoral outcome. Ms. Timoshenko was viewed negatively by many
of the country's population -- including Mr. Viktor Yushchenko, the country's
ineffective president, who finished fourth in the first round of voting and
cast his vote in the second round for "none of the above".
Mr. Yushchenko hoped that closer ties to the West would produce a vibrant
Ukrainian economy. He was wrong. For a start, Ukraine is substantially
dependent on Russia for its energy. Yushchenko was also unable significantly to
reduce government corruption. Russia did not hide its hostility to his
remaining in office.
But
in the recent election, unlike 2004, the Russian leadership did not blatantly
express its preference for Mr. Yanukovich. Instead it made it clear that Ms.
Timoshenko and Mr. Yanukovich were both individuals with whom Moscow could
work. This reduced Ms.Timoshenko's ability to play the nationalist card in the
second round of voting. Indeed, the fact that a share of the Ukrainian
electorate considered her to be ethically-challenged hurt her as a candidate.
So what of Ukraine's future? Clearly, the election result must be viewed
as a foreign policy success for the Kremlin. It looks as if Russia will
have a satellite on its southern frontier -- it is doubtful whether either the
Russian leadership or Mr. Yanukovich would risk Russian absorption of Ukraine.
The argument for partition
On the other
hand, Ukrainians who are apprehensive over the country's future might consider
division of the country. This would be difficult to
accomplish, and it might provoke a good deal of instability. It would be
particularly hard to decide exactly where precisely to partition the country.
But the alternatives might be worse.
On the positive side, for those Ukrainians who regard the prospect of renewed
subordination to Moscow with repugnance, it would provide an opportunity
to create a new state more consistent with their desires. The Russian
government might even favour the idea. It could be accomplished through a
referendum overseen by the OSCE.
International borders are often arbitrary and, over time, never
permanent. While they may reflect the topography of the land, more often
than not they are a product of political whim or of military force. Most
countries have regional differences within their borders. But borders have real
consequences for history, for language, nationality, politics and religion.
This may be the reason why Ukrainian law prohibits dual citizenship -- to
prevent ethnic Russians from undermining Ukrainian independence and effecting
reunification with Russia.
It has been approximately 18 years since the Soviet Union's break-up and the
re-emergence of the Ukrainian state. Despite the claims of many official
statements, polls and sociological surveys, Ukraine has not completely solved
its nationality problem. The present situation has certain parallels with
Yugoslavia during the 1970-80s.
Then,
to the chagrin of the federal government, more people thought of themselves as
Bosniaks, Croats, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes, than Yugoslavs. While the
preservation of Yugoslavia proved untenable, the failure to reach a political
solution led to incomprehensible death and destruction.
Nor is successful partition without precedent in recent history. In 1993,
Czechoslovakia split peaceably into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both
countries now pursue their separate courses, while moving in the same general
direction politically. The Czech Republic has a small Slovak minority, while
Slovakia has a small Hungarian minority. All three, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia, are members of both the EU and NATO.
Last, but by no means least, it might prove possible for the West to prop up a
smaller Ukraine whose government were committed to the goal of Western
development.
LINK:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ethan-s-burger/could-partition-solve-ukraine%E2%80%99s-problems
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17.
UKRAINE'S POST-ELECTION
"TO-DO" LIST
Analysis
& Commentary: by David J. Kramer
Senior
Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund (GMF)
Foreign
Policy and Civil Society Program: Focus On Ukraine
Washington, D.C., Thursday, February 11, 2010
KYIV,
Ukraine
- Contrary to earlier polls, Ukraine’s presidential election turned out to be
much closer than expected. After the run-off held on February 7, opposition
leader Viktor Yanukovych claimed victory over Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko
with more than a 3 percent lead, but Tymoshenko was not ready to concede.
She
is expected to file court challenges over claims of fraud in individual polling
stations, but international observers across the board, including the delegation
I led for the International Republican Institute, deemed this election
generally free and fair and any problems not to have been systemic in nature.
Tymoshenko, of course, has every right to pursue her legal options, but it
would be unfortunate if her efforts led to weeks of squabbling and political
paralysis. Ukrainians have had enough of that over the past few years, when
they grew disillusioned with those associated with the 2004 Orange Revolution.
Based
on the preliminary assessment of foreign observers, neither problems that may
have occurred on Election Day nor a controversial change made to the electoral
law three days before the election had an appreciable impact on the election
itself. Barring the unexpected, Ukraine will see Yanukovych assume the reins as
president.
There
are some in the West who will be unhappy with the election outcome. They will
see Yanukovych’s victory as the final nail in the Orange Revolution’s coffin
and will want to keep their distance from Ukraine. This would be exactly the
wrong approach to take. Leaders in the West need to engage the new president
and his team immediately after he assumes office.
Here are some things they should do in the near
term:
[1] Invite
Yanukovych to the West. U.S. President Barack Obama will be hosting a nuclear
security summit in April, and Yanukoych’s participation in that would be a good
start. EU countries should also reach out to him out of recognition that
Ukraine is a vital neighbor.
[2] Visit
Kyiv. Western leaders should make Kyiv a key place to visit, not on the way to
or from Moscow but on its own.
[3] Strengthen
bilateral commissions on a level comparable to what Obama established with
Russia last year. Dealing with Ukraine can be frustrating, but the alternative
of keeping a distance is even worse, especially when Moscow will be reaching
out aggressively to the new government in Kyiv.
[4]
For the European Union, move forward on finalizing a free trade agreement with
Ukraine and visa liberalization. It should stress that future membership
in the European Union, while not in the offing in the near-term, is a
possibility. The door to the European Union must remain open to Ukraine if it
undertakes the necessary reforms over the next few years.
[5] Avoid pressing on membership in NATO, especially since the majority of
Ukrainians do not support NATO membership at this time. Injecting this issue
into the political debate in Ukraine now would be distracting and
counter-productive but NATO should keep its door open, too.
[6] Push for resumption of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending if
Ukraine’s parliament and leaders stop their inflationary and unaffordable
budgetary and fiscal policies.
For Yanukovych, he should:
[1] Appoint people to government positions based on experience and
talent, not solely as payback for political favors, and include individuals
from Tymoshenko’s bloc. Choosing a replacement for Tymoshenko, should she leave
or be voted out by the Parliament, will be especially important. After
experiencing a nearly 15 percent drop in GDP last year, Ukraine cannot afford
continued delays in fixing the economy.
[2]
Keep people who work well in the West, such as Ambassador Oleh Shamshur in
Washington, in their positions. Continuity in personnel wherever possible will
have a reassuring effect on the West.
[3] Visit Brussels and Washington sooner rather than later. There is a
caricature of Yanukovych as the pro-Russian candidate. Visiting Western
capitals would go some distance toward disabusing those suspicious of him.
[4] Pursue improved relations with Moscow, which deteriorated under
outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko, but protect Ukraine’s interests on issues
concerning energy security and the Black Sea Fleet. Similarly, reject Russian
pressure to recognize the separatist Georgian regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.
[5]
Avoid divisive issues like making Russian the second official language. This
will cause a nasty debate in the Parliament and unnecessarily distract from
issues like economic reform. Focus on urgent needs, including paying gas bills
to Russia and resuming IMF assistance based on fiscal discipline.
[6] Avoid a push for early parliamentary elections. Some in his party see
this as a way to increase their control over the legislature. The last thing
Ukraine needs is another election—the people here, despite impressive turnout
numbers (68%) on Sunday, want to see their leaders govern effectively, not
engage in endless electoral campaigns.
Ukraine,
a country of 46 million people strategically located between Russia and
countries of the European Union, has enormous potential to contribute to
European stability and security. It is important in its own right, not through
a Russian prism. It just held yet another election, following parliamentary
elections in 2006 and 2007 and the re-run of the 2004 election, which passed
international standard—no small accomplishment in this part of the world.
Whatever
they think of Yanukovych, Western leaders need to get over their “Ukraine
fatigue” and engage the country, its leaders, and its people more than they
have in the past.
NOTE: David J. Kramer is senior transatlantic fellow with
the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) in Washington, DC. Kramer
headed the International Republican Institute’s election observation delegation
to Ukraine’s second round of the presidential election. The views expressed are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
As a Senior Transatlantic Fellow, David J. Kramer works on issues related to
Russia/Eurasia and wider Europe as well as democracy and human rights. He came
to GMF after more than eight years at the U.S. State Department in various capacities,
most recently as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and
labor.
Before
that, he was a deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian
Affairs, responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus affairs, as well
as regional nonproliferation issues. He also served in the Office of Policy
Planning and as senior advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Global
Affairs. Mr. Kramer received his master’s degree from Harvard University and
his bachelor’s degree from Tufts University.
About GMF
The
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American
public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to
promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and
Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on
transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing
transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation
can address a variety of global policy challenges.
Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan
assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In
addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in
Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
LINK:
color:purple'>http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=809&parent_type=P
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18.
UKRAINE UNDER YANUKOVYCH:
RELATIONS WITH THE EU
Euractiv.com, Brussels,
Belgium, Thu, 18 February 2010
BRUSSELS - "In the immediate future
[Viktor Yanukovych] needs to demonstrate that he is not a Russian stooge, so
the EU should use this opportunity to strengthen relations with Ukraine,
pushing for reforms but offering assistance," argues Amanda Paul, a
researcher at the European Policy Centre, in a February paper.
"Mr.
Yanukovych's approach to the West, and the EU in particular, may in some
respects not be totally dissimilar to that of former President Leonid Kuchma,
as he may revert to the old game of 'being in-between' endeavouring to play the
EU and Russia against each other.
In
the medium to long term, however, Kiev's relations with Moscow will be
determined by how Europe (and the US) set their relations with Mr Yanukovych,
and given that he plans to visit Brussels early on in his presidency, the EU
should send a strong message that it sees him as being pro-
European.
The
president-elect wants international recognition, and Ukraine will be unable to
modernise without large-scale Western assistance and investment, so the EU should
continue to push Ukraine on a number of key issues, including reforming the
energy sector, improving the electoral system and constitutional and judicial
reform. Ensuring the independence of the judiciary (especially the
Constitutional Court) is a particularly urgent task as in its current state it
cannot serve as an impartial referee.
Until
now it has been more beneficial financially to delay reforms and only strong
outside pressure, starting with the EU, could tip the balance and bring about
change. Negotiations with the EU on a new Association Agreement will continue,
although the final framework of the free trade zone – which is an essential
part of the future deal - will depend on how deeper economic and regulatory
integration with the EU is seen by Yanukovych's inner circle.
On
the other hand, taking into account Ukraine's WTO membership, it is highly
unlikely that the country will pursue cooperation with Moscow on the
Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union.
As a
tangible incentive to making progress, the EU could push ahead on an issue
close to the hearts of Ukrainians – namely visa liberalisation - by way of a
visa-free roadmap as happened in the Western Balkans.
Ukraine
finds itself at yet another crossroads. The Orange Revolution may be a thing of
the past, but its legacy will live on: its achievements should not be forgotten
but built upon. It is up to Ukraine's leadership and political elites to create
a climate of political and economic stability and deliver some tangible results
to the long-suffering population, rather than continuing with the destructive
infighting of the last five years."
LINK:
http://www.euractiv.com/en/east-mediterranean/ukraine-under-yanukovych-relations-eu-analysis-260459
LINK:
http://www.euractiv.com/sites/all/euractiv/files/Ukraine%20under%20Yanukovych%20(2).pdf
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19.
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY:
TYMOSHENKO TAKES BATTLE TO THE COURTS
INFORM:
Newsletter for the international community providing
views and analysis from the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, Feb 15, 2010, Issue 141
KYIV - Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has said that she will
challenge the results of the presidential election in court following evidence
of widespread fraud. On Sunday, the Central Election Commission (CEC) declared
Viktor Yanukovych the next president and published results identical to the
preliminary results announced last Wednesday.
The declared results confirmed a gap between Ms Tymoshenko and the Party of
Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych of just 3.48 percent, which amounts to some
900,000 votes.
Pre-empting the official result, Ms Tymoshenko addressed the nation on
Saturday. She thanked her supporters and explained that, since the election on
7 February, her team had been working with lawyers to collect and catalogue
evidence of election falsifications to be presented in court.
In particular, the premier cited irregularities in the southern autonomous
region of Crimea – a Russian-speaking stronghold of Mr Yanukovych – where she
alleged 3-8 percent of votes were fraudulently given to him. She said that
overall Mr Yanukovych’s team had stolen more than one million votes, more then
enough to sway the result in his favour.
A steely faced Ms Tymoshenko told TV viewers, “With all the evidence, I took
the only possible solution - to challenge the election results in court.”
Acknowledging that Ukrainians were weary from years of political instability,
she stressed the need for stability and calm. But she drove home her message,
“Not going to the courts today would mean leaving Ukraine to criminals without
a fight."
While election monitors were quick to declare the election process had been
“free and fair,” there has been growing disquiet that their proclamations were
too premature, considering the fraud demonstrated by Mr Yanukovych’s supporters
five years ago.
“Yanukovych’s team has learned much since 2004,” said First Deputy Prime
Minister Oleksandr Turchynov, “the falsifications we have witnessed are less
obvious and much harder to verify, but they are there.”
In her address, Ms Tymoshenko said that several observers from the Organisation
for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) election monitoring mission
supported her challenge and were concerned at “systematic fraud.”
Last week the OSCE and other bodies gave the Ukraine election a clean bill of
health. It did however voice concern over a major change in-between rounds in
the election process.
Legislation
hurriedly instigated by the Party of Regions dispensed with the requirement for
a quorum of representatives from both sides to approve the count. It meant that
in 38,000 polling stations nationwide, local Party of Regions commissioners had
the power to sign-off the results without the approval from commission members
from the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT).
Yesterday the CEC said that it will not consider Ms Tymoshenko’s complaints.
Meanwhile, Ms Tymoshenko’s representative at the CEC said that they will take
the issue to the courts. He confirmed there are 43 cases in the Kyiv court of
appeals concerning the inaction of the CEC in considering complaints. Going
through the courts will be an uphill struggle for Ms Tymoshenko. Both the CEC
and the courts are staffed predominantly by Party of Regions-run
officials.
“I very well know, as you do, the quality of our courts. But at the same time,
I have a responsibility to you and the country to fight for the restoration of
justice,” said Ms Tymoshenko.
REPORTED ELECTION
IRREGULARITIES
[1] Unusually high number of ballots with votes cast for Ms Tymoshenko
intentionally damaged and therefore invalidated.
[2] With the help of local government bodies, parallel lists of voters
were drawn up in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, enabling voters to vote
twice.
[3] Numerous changes in the voter list were made on the day of voting in
violation of the law.
[4] Cases of voting by election commissioners or other voters for other
persons not present at the polling station.
[5] Artificial increase in the turnout in Eastern regions of Ukraine
caused by the transport between voting precincts of voters organised by the
Party of Regions. Furthermore, intensive campaigning on the
day of elections is in violation of the law.
[6] Numerous violations in the PEC protocols submitted to the DECs;
violations of requirements on the corrections in the PEC protocols.
[7] A suspiciously high number of voters who voted from home (more then 1
million), many of whom did not have permission to do so. A high incidence of
home voting based on applications written in the same handwriting.
[8] Counting of damaged ballots in favour of Viktor Yanukovych in the
southern and eastern regions of Ukraine.
NOTE: Questions or comments? Email the Inform Newsletter at nlysova@beauty.net.ua.
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20. THE
REVOLUTION IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTION
Just because the Orange revolutionaries
lost in Ukraine, doesn't mean their cause did.
Analysis & Commentary: By David J. Kramer, Foreign
Policy, Wash, D.C., Mon, Feb 8, 2010
Ukrainian opposition leader Viktor Yanukovych's apparent victory in yesterday's
presidential election over Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko -- at last count, he
had about a 3 percent lead and was pushing Tymoshenko to concede -- has many
observers ready to proclaim the death of the Orange Revolution.
Indeed, the revolution's hero, Viktor Yushchenko, got less than 6 percent of
the vote last month in the election's first round. If his prime minister,
Tymoshenko, loses too, the election will certainly mark a reverse-changing of
the guard. This year's victor, Yanukovych, was the very leader ousted after
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets of Kiev in chilly
November and December, 2004.
Nothing like that is expected this time because much has changed since 2004.
And despite its apparent reversal, the Orange Revolution is partly responsible
for the much improved climate this time around.
For sure, Ukrainians have good reason to feel disappointed with what became of
the Orange Revolution of 2004; its dreams were never realized, leading to
tremendous disillusionment among Ukrainians and observers in the West.
President Yushchenko's dismal showing in the first round reflected the
population's strong disapproval of his leadership.
Tymoshenko, Yushchenko's erstwhile Orange Revolution partner, also bore
responsibility as current prime minister -- overseeing a disastrous economic
performance last year that saw GDP decline nearly 15 percent. Even in Europe
and Washington, "Ukraine fatigue" had set in.
So now, five years after so many Ukrainians went to the polls to
enthusiastically vote for their candidate, this time around many held their
nose while casting their ballots, voting as much against Yushchenko as for a
candidate. Turnout in the first round, while lower than in 2004, was a
respectable 67 percent; in the second round, it was 68 percent. (Ukrainians,
trained during Soviet times to turn out to vote, still take their civic
responsibility seriously, even in freezing cold temperatures.)
But while less invigorating than the 2004 campaign, this year's vote was also
quite a bit cleaner. Last time, the leading opposition candidate, Yushchenko,
was poisoned with dioxin; those responsible have still not been held
accountable. The media in 2004 operated in a climate of fear and were given
orders from the administration on what to write and report. The party in power
engaged in massive electoral abuse, for example by spending state resources to
support the candidacy of the incumbent, Yanukovych.
Russia weighed in -- in an incredibly heavy-handed manner, providing some $600
million in support of Yanukovych's campaign. As if the message wasn't clear
enough, Russian President Vladimir Putin stood at Yanukovych's side twice
during the race to demonstrate his country's support for the incumbent, once
during a military parade down a main street in Kiev. Of course, Moscow's
support eventually backfired as Ukrainians decided that they (not the Russians)
should choose their leader.
No such funny business was repeated this time around, nor during parliamentary
elections in 2006 and 2007. None of the candidates faced harm or intimidation.
The media are today the freest and most diverse in the former Soviet Union.
Although some journalists are still on the payrolls of candidates and business
interests (it doesn't help that oligarchs own most of the TV stations), they
are free to slam the government and candidates at will -- without fear for
their lives.
Administrative abuses have been minimal, evidenced by the fact that the sitting
president came in an embarrassing fifth place. And even Russia largely stayed
on the sidelines, having learned its lesson the hard way five years ago.
Besides, this time Moscow seemed ambivalent between the two front-runners. As
one observer put it, Moscow likes Tymoshenko but doesn't trust her; they trust
Yanukovych more but don't like him.
All these positives add up to an election that is fundamentally different from
the 2004 vote. This is in fact the third ballot, after the two parliamentary
ones in 2006 and 2007, to have passed the test of international election
observers. In other words, Ukraine has shown that it knows how to conduct good
elections in a relatively democratic space. That neither candidate in this
second round was terribly appealing should not detract from the gains that have
been made over the past five years.
Moreover, results in the first round also offered hope that some
relatively "new" faces may not be far in the offing. These included
former foreign minister and speaker of the parliament Arseniy Yatsenyuk and
former central bank governor and businessman Serhei Tigipko (who also ran
Yanukovych's campaign in 2004). The latter's third-place showing surprised many
people and suggested that new political leaders are gaining momentum.
So what is up next for Ukraine? We are likely to see court
challenges by the Tymoshenko camp, which, given the narrow deficit she faces,
is not unreasonable. Hopefully, these legal challenges will be resolved as soon
as possible, since the last thing Ukraine needs is a long, drawn-out, legal
process that leaves the country in a state of uncertainty or paralysis.
Once the results are official and the new president is sworn in,
it is vital that the West engages right away. There is no doubt that Russia,
which agreed to send a new ambassador to Ukraine after the first round, will be
looking to step up its engagement with the new team in Kiev.
The West should do the same, not out of a sense of competition
with Moscow but out of recognition that Ukraine is important and matters in its
own right. Ukraine, a country of 46 million strategically located between
Russia and the European Union, holds tremendous potential as a contributor to
regional stability. If all goes according to plan, it could even become a model
for other countries in the region, including Russia, to follow.
But here's the message to those writing the obituaries of the
Orange Revolution: Put down your pens and step back from those keyboard, get
over your Ukraine fatigue, take aspirin for the headaches still to come, and do
everything possible to ensure that the positives from 2004 do not go to
waste.
NOTE:
David J. Kramer is senior transatlantic fellow at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington. He headed the International
Republican Institute's election observation delegation to Ukraine's second
round of the presidential election. He writes here in a personal capacity.
LINK:
color:purple'>http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/08/ why_the_orange_revolution_didnt_just_die
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21.
IN UKRAINE THE NEXT
POLITICAL WAR BEGINS
Analysis
& Commentary: By Tammy Lynch
The
ISCIP Analyst (Caucasus/Central Asia/Western Regions),
An
Analytical Review, Volume XVI, No. 8, Boston University,
Boston,
MA, Thursday, 18 February 10
BOSTON - On 16 February, Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia
Tymoshenko made good on earlier statements by officially filing documents with
the country’s Supreme (Higher) Administrative Court to overturn the country’s
presidential election results. (1)
One
day later, the Court suspended the official declaration of results by the
Central Election Commission (CEC) while it examines the three large boxes of
documents submitted with Tymoshenko’s complaint. (2)
The
court, however, declined to halt the scheduled 25 February inauguration of
Yanukovych, saying its jurisdiction only allows it to deal with the actions of
the CEC. However, electoral legislation grants the court only up to five days
to rule on complaints of election fraud, so the decision must be released by 21
February – four days before the inauguration.
Previously
announced election winner—and current candidate—Viktor Yanukovych responded to
the court’s action with silence. Yanukovych’s ally Hanna Herman, however,
dismissed the move as a “mere formality.” (3)
Herman
is correct, to a point. In accepting the complaint for consideration, the court
must automatically suspend the declaration of results. It is not meant to
suggest any conclusion regarding the legality of the results.
However,
the court also had the option to find no legal cause to examine the complaint.
Tymoshenko’s evidence apparently met the minimum burden of proof for
consideration of the claim.
Regardless,
most experts suggest that Tymoshenko’s complaint is very unlikely to be found
valid by the court. While the evidence presented “surpassed all expectations,”
according to analyst Volodymyr Polyakov and others questioned by Ukraine’s
media, most agree that to overturn the results, clear evidence of systemic
fraud would be required. (4)
Tymoshenko’s
evidence appears instead to show possibly significant, but regionalized,
irregularities that may or may not have affected the outcome. In addition, at least one
analyst suggests that Yanukovych possesses allies on the court.
Therefore, “Tymoshenko knows she has little chance of winning, but she will use
the proceedings to make strong accusations,” according to Viktor Nebozhenko.
(5)
Ihor Zhdanov, a former close ally of President Viktor Yushchenko and one of
Ukraine’s more respected political analysts, suggests that Tymoshenko’s key
evidence includes a reported increase of around 300,000 individuals on the
voter lists on election-day. (6)
Following round one of the election, the European Network of Election
Monitoring Organizations also cited concern about an increase of 400,000 people
on the voter lists on that election-day. (7) It is unclear how or why hundreds
of thousands of voters came to be added only as votes were being cast during
round one and round two.
It
is also unclear if the additional voters were added uniformly in all regions or
only in specific areas. However, it is understandable why this issue, in a race
determined by under 890,000 votes, would be viewed as critical by Tymoshenko’s
team.
In
its official English-language newsletter, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko also
alleges irregularities with “a suspiciously high number of voters who voted
from home,” including “a high incidence of home voting based on applications in
the same handwriting.” The Bloc also claims that “an unusually high number of
ballots for Ms. Tymoshenko [were] intentionally damaged and therefore
invalidated,” and “parallel lists of voters were drawn up in the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, enabling voters to vote twice.” (8)
Yanukovych’s
team, as well as the Central Election Commission, vigorously deny these
charges.
Since
evidence has not been released publicly, it is not known if these statements
are supported with clear, convincing documentation. For this reason, Ukrainians
have called on the Court to conduct an open, transparent hearing, which will
allow the evidence to be entered into the court of public opinion.
These
calls became louder after President Yushchenko—a staunch Tymoshenko
opponent—met with the head of the Supreme Administrative Court. The meeting
occurred just hours before his rival officially filed her case. (9)
Any
suggestion of irregularities that impacted the election outcome will fly in the
face of the findings of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, which
found the election free and fair. "Yesterday's vote was an impressive
display of democratic elections,” the OSCE said in a press release. “For
everyone in Ukraine, this election was a victory.” (10)
The
OSCE’s voter list numbers also do not correspond with Tymoshenko’s stated
300,000 voters added to voter lists during round two. The OSCE documented an
increase of individuals on voter lists during round two of 150,773 but did not
include foreign precincts, including those in Russia. The
OSCE
confirms, however, that 400,000 individuals were added to voter lists during
round one, and suggests that it is unknown how those 400,000 were dealt with
between election rounds:
“Changes
to the voter lists were only partly entered into the voter register, due to the
fact that the procedures for transmitting data on voters added to the lists
were adopted late and were not applied in a uniform manner. In addition, 21
DECs [District Electoral Commissions – ed.] only partly submitted the
information to the register maintenance bodies (RMBs).
As a
result, some voters had to re-apply to be added to the voter lists for the
second round. Some RMBs failed to check whether voters added to voter lists on
election day were legitimately added to the lists.” (11)
The
OSCE also noted, “Some 1.4 million voters (3.9 per cent of the total number of
voters) were registered to vote by mobile ballot box, about 220,000 voters more
than in the first round.” (12)
The
organization, however, did not find that these issues directly affected the
outcome of the election. In fact, while many monitoring groups found regional
or localized problems—including pens with disappearing ink at 17 polling
stations in Kyiv—none called the election unfair or unfree.
And
in reality, this is largely true. With over 25 million votes cast, questions
remain about a small fraction of them – under one million. The majority of
voters cast their ballots in an election that was conducted freely following an
open, spirited campaign that was covered by a generally free media. This is
something of which to be proud – and something rare in the former Soviet Union.
But
because the margin of victory was so small, the questionable votes identified
by Tymoshenko are now an issue.
Should
this court find Tymoshenko’s complaint credible, it’s only real option is to
nullify the CEC declaration of victory and order the Commission to investigate
these irregularities fully. It has no jurisdiction to overturn results. Should
the CEC fail to act, Tymoshenko could file another complaint to overturn the
results with the Ukraine Supreme Court, based on fraud.
Since
this seems unlikely, Viktor Yanukovych probably will be inaugurated as planned
on 25 February.
At
this point, he will be Ukraine President, but Tymoshenko will remain Prime
Minister – in the office that holds much of the country’s real power. The
Prime Minister is nominated and confirmed by parliament. The President’s only
duty in this regard is the ceremonial job of entering the nominated name into
parliamentary consideration.
The
closeness of the election and Tymoshenko’s success so far in undermining Yanukovych’s
victory means it will be more difficult for Yanukovych’s party to replace her
as Prime Minister. Should the new president want to do so, he will need to do
one of two things:
(1) launch an all-out political battle against the head of government,
providing Tymoshenko with the opportunity to claim victimhood and withdraw to
lead the opposition – as Yanukovych and his new PM take responsibility for the
continuing recession; or
(2) dissolve the parliament and call new parliamentary elections, hoping that
Tymoshenko’s claims of election fraud haven’t allowed her to shore up
her support. New parliamentary elections with an equal or stronger Bloc of
Yulia Tymoshenko would be disastrous for Yanukovych.
So, while Tymoshenko is unlikely to win the court battle over election results,
it appears she already has made significant progress in the new political war
for power and influence.
Source Notes:
(1)
“Ukraine’s PM Lodges Appeal,” Reuters/Montreal Gazette, 17 Feb 10 via http://www.montrealgazette.com.
(2)
“Ukrainian election results suspended on appeal,” Associated Press, 17 Feb 10
via Google News.
(3) “Court Suspends Ukraine Vote Results,” AP/Moscow Times, 18 Feb 10 via www.moscowtimes.com.
(4)
“Experts on Tymoshenko chances to win lawsuit,” Zik – Western Information
Agency, 2136 CET, 17 Feb 2010 via http://zik.com.ua.
(5) “Court Suspends Ukraine Vote Results,” AP/Moscow Times.
(6) “Experts on Tymoshenko chances to win lawsuit,” Zik-Western Information
Agency.
(7) Ukraine Presidential Election, Report on Pre-Election Period, January
18-February 4 2010, page 2, via
http://www.isfed.ge/pdf/enemo_report_on_pre_election_period_ukraine.pdf.
(8)
“Inform Newsletter,” 15 Feb 10 via email.
(9) Ukrayinska Pravda, 1616 CET, 15 Feb 2010 via http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/02/15/4773483/.
(10)
Press Release: “Run-off confirms that Ukraine's presidential election meets
most international commitments,” OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights – Elections, 8 Feb 10 via http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/item_1_42681.html.
(11)
“INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSI O N Ukraine — Presidential Election,
Second Round 7 February 2010 STATEMENT OF
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS,” 8 Feb 10, page 3 via http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2010/02/42679_en.pdf.
(12)
Ibid, page 6.
CONTACT: Tammy Lynch (tammymlynch@hotmail.com)
LINK: www.bu.edu/iscip; Institute for the Study of
Conflict, Ideology & Policy at Boston University, 141 Bay State Road,
Boston, MA 02215.
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22.
INSIDE UKRAINE:
YANUKOVYCH UNCOVERED
Analysis
& Commentary: By Ivan Poltavets and Ievgenii Rovnyi
Inside Ukraine #5, International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS)
Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, February 18, 2010
KYIV - Dear colleagues, please find at the following links the
February issue of Inside Ukraine "Yanukovych Uncovered," http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/index.html or
http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/55/63/Inside_Ukraine_ENG_5_Febr_2010.pdf
The official results of the run-off election announced by the Central Election
Commission made Viktor Yanukovych the new President of Ukraine. The
OSCE and other international observers concluded that Ukraine's election was
fair and transparent and world leaders have already congratulated the
President-elect. Still, uncertainty about how the political situation might
evolve in Ukraine remains high.
In this special issue of Inside Ukraine, ICPS takes a revealing look at Viktor
Yanukovych. We do a little reality check on major myths about Mr.
Yanukovych. We look at the challenges that the new President will face,
appointments he may make, the foreign policy agenda that he will push
through, and the domestic policies he will have to back or oppose.
We also suggest 7 tests for Mr. Yanukovych that will allow both Ukrainians and
the international community to understand where Ukraine is heading.
Enjoy, Olga SHUMYLO, Director, International Centre for, Policy Studies, Kyiv,
Ukraine, http://www.icps.com.ua/eng/index.html
LINK:
http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/55/63/Inside_Ukraine_ENG_5_Febr_2010.pdf
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23.
CURING 'UKRAINE FATIGUE'
Op-Ed, By
Steven Pifer, The New York Times, NY, NY, Tue, Feb 9, 2010
If Viktor Yanukovich, the winner of the presidential race in Ukraine, acts
quickly to address his country’s pressing problems, he could move it out of
the doldrums and cure the “Ukraine fatigue” afflicting Washington and most
European capitals.
As Viktor Yushchenko exits the presidency, Ukraine faces a host of problems. It
suffered a crushing 14 percent fall in gross domestic product in 2009.
Unwise pricing policies and widespread corruption have put the critical gas
sector in virtual bankruptcy. The nasty in-fighting between Mr. Yushchenko
and his prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, kept Kiev from implementing needed
responses to these challenges.
As a result, Ukraine fatigue has again gripped the West. This malady first
broke out in 1998 in the U.S. Congress. American legislators, weary of the
slow pace of reform and mistreatment of U.S. investors, scaled back their
generous assistance earmarks for Kiev. A subsequent outbreak was cured by
the 2004 Orange Revolution, as Ukrainians inspired the West with a determined
defense of their right to have their votes counted fairly.
Unfortunately, Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko, close allies during the Orange
Revolution, could not cooperate in power and failed to build on the
revolution’s promise. Ukraine fatigue returned with a vengeance. The country
has ceased to be a priority for the European Union and, given everything now
on the Obama foreign policy plate, barely registers on Washington’s radar.
Mr. Yanukovich’s victory on Sunday rings with irony. After all, the Orange
Revolution threw out his tainted election. But the Ukrainian electorate has
given him a new chance. He now has an opportunity — and the responsibility — to
show he can provide the decisive leadership his country needs.
Whatever
the preferences might have been in the Washington and Europe, Ukrainians have
made their choice. No compelling evidence of major voting
irregularities has emerged, and international observers praised the election
for meeting democratic standards, now the norm for Ukraine. The West should
congratulate and engage Mr. Yanukovich, and urge him to get on with addressing
Ukraine’s daunting problems.
A serious attack on corruption would create better conditions for both
Ukrainian and foreign businesses. Reforming the gas sector would strengthen
Ukraine’s energy security and benefit Europe: Gas spats between Kiev and Moscow
have twice in the past four years halted gas flows to Europe.
Coherent policymaking in Kiev would give Western capitals something with which
to work.
Tackling this reform agenda will require tough decisions by Ukraine’s new
leadership. The United States and European Union should jointly send a
message to Kiev containing three key points:
[1] First, the West welcomes Mr. Yanukovich as the democratically
elected leader of Ukraine. However, a reversal of the democratic progress that
Kiev
has made in the past five years would have profoundly negative consequences for
relations with the West.
[2] Second, the West understands that Mr. Yanukovich’s foreign policy
may differ from his predecessor’s. The doors to integration and cooperation
with
institutions such as the European Union and NATO nevertheless will remain open;
Kiev should indicate how far and how fast it wishes to proceed.
[3] Third, the West will assess his seriousness by the seriousness of
his policies. The West cannot want Ukraine to succeed more than Ukrainians do.
Should Mr. Yanukovich avoid crucial actions such as energy sector reform, that
is his choice — even an understandable one given the tough politics
that surround the issue. The West will still seek good relations. But
Washington and Brussels should make clear that in such circumstances, Kiev
should not expect the West to extend itself by intervening, for example, with
the International Monetary Fund to cut Ukraine slack on meeting its loan
obligations.
The goal should be to encourage Kiev to take steps that will make Ukraine more
democratic, more stable and more capable of fending for itself. That will
advance the country’s interests and make it a better partner for Europe. If
Kiev proves unwilling to take such steps, the county will linger in the
doldrums — and Ukraine fatigue in the West will grow.
NOTE: Steven Pifer is a former
U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and a senior fellow at The Brookings Institution in
Washington. A version of this article appeared in print on February 10, 2010,
in The International Herald Tribune.
LINK: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/opinion/10iht-edpifer.html?scp=1&sq=pifer%20ukraine%20&st=cse
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24.
UKRAINE WILL BE A BRIDGE
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
We are a nation with a European identity, but we have historic
cultural
and economic ties to Russia as well. We can benefit from both.
Opinion
Europe: By Victor Yanukovych
The
Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, Wed, Feb 17, 2010
Over
the past month, Ukraine has demonstrated twice that it cherishes the values of
democracy and the belief that it is important for people to vote. Ukraine's
presidential election was validated by all of the major international observer
groups as free, fair and transparent, which attested to the Ukrainian people's
resolve for a democratic election. The people of Ukraine desired change and
their voices were heard. Now we have the great responsibility to help our
fellow countrymen, who have cast votes for me hoping for a better life.
This election was defined by a financial and economic crisis that has
devastated our country. Before the global economic crisis, Ukraine was one of
Europe's top emerging markets, and economic prosperity did not seem beyond our
reach in the near term. Now all that has changed, and the people demanded
change in the way our Government works in Ukraine.
We must still put an end to the political turmoil that has crippled Ukraine and
held our country hostage for so long. I will work ardently to do this as
president. The only way that this can be accomplished is for the top political
forces and their leaders, immediately after the presidential election results
have been declared and certified, to avoid confrontation and unite for the sake
of saving our country. We are a nation capable of great things but we will
accomplish none of them if we continue to bicker among ourselves and ignore the
enormous challenges that we must confront.
Let me say here, a Yanukovych presidency is committed to the integration of
European values in Ukraine. Ukraine should make use of its geopolitical
advantages and become a bridge between Russia and the West. Developing a good
relationship with the West and bridging the gap to Russia will help Ukraine. We
should not be forced to make the false choice between the benefits of the East
and those of the West.
As
president I will endeavor to build a bridge between both, not a one-way street
in either direction. We are a nation with a European identity, but we have
historic cultural and economic ties to Russia as well. The re-establishment of
relations with the Russian Federation is consistent with our European
ambitions. We will rebuild relations with Moscow as a strategic economic
partner. There is no reason that good relations with all of our neighbors
cannot be achieved.
If we hope to become a bridge between two important spheres we cannot merely
talk and make promises; we must deliver concrete policies and achieve real
progress. If we hope to join the European Union we must secure political
stability and establish ourselves as an economically viable nation. We must be
pragmatic and focused to achieve EU membership. We must create transparent
policies that allow our economy to thrive and demonstrate that Ukraine will add
value to the EU as a new member state.
I am committed to conducting a policy that would strengthen our links with
respected international financial institutions, and increase our standing in
the world economic community. My election program, "Ukraine for the
People," is a deep and comprehensive plan that clearly specifies how to
achieve social and economic progress. It is not an easy task.
We
will be confronted with the same conflicts as Europe and Washington have
faced—how to stimulate our economy to create jobs while not decreasing the
social protections needed by our citizens. We must defeat corruption, which has
become rampant over the last several years and has damaged our ability to
attract foreign investment.
If we hope to join the EU and raise the standard of living of Ukrainians to
that of other European nations, we must restore our economy from within. There
are three fundamental objectives the Ukrainian economy must achieve in order to
thrive: First, we must create jobs; second, we must stabilize prices so people
can afford the necessities that they need to live; and third, we must ensure
our citizens receive adequate wages and pensions. Giving our citizens a basic
economic foundation is a critical first step to restoring the broken bond
between the people and the government of Ukraine.
And so that is my agenda—to restore economic vitality and calm the political
turbulence that has plagued our nation; to enable Ukraine to take advantage of
its natural positioning as a thriving bridge between Russia and the West; and
finally, to prepare a free and open Ukraine, economically and politically, to
join the European Union when the time comes.
Ukraine is a beautiful country with hard-working and virtuous people who ask
only for a chance at a better life. I know that if we can come together, we
will achieve great things. As president, I plan to give Ukrainians the nation
they deserve—a Ukraine for the people.
NOTE:
Mr. Yanukovych is president-elect of Ukraine.
LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870480420457506925184 3839386.html?KEYWORDS=ukraine
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25.
YANUKOVYCH'S RUSSIAN
OVERTURES MAY SIGNAL UKRAINE'S ALLEGIANCE
By
Daryna Krasnolutska and Lyubov Pronina
Bloomberg
News, Kiev, Ukraine, Wed, Feb 17, 2010
KIEV - Ukraine’s President-elect Viktor Yanukovych may be
stepping up efforts to move the former Soviet state closer to Russia and end a
standoff that’s obstructed gas flows and heightened regional tensions for half
a decade.
In the 11 days since beating Yulia Timoshenko in a runoff vote, Yanukovych
signaled on his Web site he may allow Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to stay in
Ukrainian waters. He asked for Russian help to ease gas flows into Europe and
yesterday said he wants Ukraine to join Russia’s customs union with Belarus and
Kazakhstan, Kommersant reported.
Yanukovych’s
“policy will steer the country toward a return of good, friendly relations with
Russia,” said Sergei Markov, a lawmaker in Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s
United Russia Party. “What we observed before was an artificial attempt to make
Russia and Ukraine quarrel.”
Yanukovych, 59, who has promised to restore Russian as Ukraine’s second
official language, also says he will seek to balance Russian and European Union
ties. While he wrote in the Wall St. Journal yesterday that he wants to prepare
Ukraine for EU membership “when the time comes,” his actions indicate his
ambition to renew relations with Moscow may be stronger than he signaled
previously.
“Yanukovych
is still under the influence of his election win,” said Yuriy Yakymenko, an
analyst at the Kiev-based Razumkov Center for Political and Economic Studies.
“He pledged to implement all changes that Russia would like to see, ignoring
Ukraine’s political context and without thinking whether he really can do it.”
NEW COLD WAR
The
defeat of outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko in the Jan. 17 first round ended
an era of tense Ukraine-Russian relations that contributed to a souring of ties
between Moscow and Washington.
Former
Presidents George W. Bush and Putin used Yushchenko’s ambition to steer the
country into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as an excuse to ramp up
antagonism between the two former Cold War adversaries and prompted fears of a
military clash in the region.
The
Kremlin curbed natural-gas deliveries to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, withheld a
new ambassador to Kiev and accused Yushchenko of supplying arms to Georgia
during Russia’s war with its southern neighbor in August 2008.
Yushchenko,
who defeated Yanukovych in the 2004 Orange Revolution, had targeted NATO
membership and joining the European Union as ways of freeing Ukraine from
Russian influence. Ukraine’s economic collapse since then, which has left it
reliant on a $16.4 billion International Monetary Fund loan, and his bickering
with Timoshenko have left voters jaded and contributed to his defeat.
‘STRATEGIC PARTNER"
In yesterday’s Journal article, Yanukovych pledged to rebuild ties with
Ukraine’s nuclear-armed neighbor. “We are a nation with a European identity but
we have historic cultural and economic ties to Russia as well,” he wrote. “We
will rebuild relations with Moscow as a strategic economic partner.”
Russia,
which traces its statehood to medieval Kiev, shares close economic, linguistic
and religious ties to its neighbor. Without Ukraine, Russia stops being an
empire with a foothold in Europe, former U.S. national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in his 1997 book “The Grand Chessboard.”
Ukraine
was incorporated into the USSR in 1922 and it was known as the breadbasket of
the Soviet empire because of its agricultural produce.
Much
of industrialized eastern Ukraine is populated by Russian speakers whose first
loyalty was always to Moscow. The Crimean peninsula on the Black Sea,
associated with some of Russia’s greatest writers including Chekhov, Bulgakov
and Tolstoy, was given to the Ukrainian soviet republic by Russia in 1954.
"EAST IS RUSSIAN"
Russia’s
Black Sea fleet is based in Crimea and 80 percent of Russian gas exports to
Europe go through Ukrainian territory. Eastern Ukraine will become part of
Russia “in five years,” said Vladimir Zhirinovsky, head of the
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, on Ekho Moskvy radio. “The east is Russian.
The population is largely Russian,” Yanukovych is “basically Russian.”
Though
Yanukovych has made clear he won’t stick to the NATO membership aspiration,
some of his promises to Russia will require significant legislative upheaval to
enact.
His
offer to allow the Black Sea Fleet to stay past 2017 ignores Ukraine’s
constitution, which doesn’t allow foreign troops outside the terms of the
lease. Yanukovych will need to secure a 300 vote majority in the 450-seat
parliament to overturn that law.
"CHANGE IN POLICY
Ukraine’s
military strategy stipulates that the country should target NATO entry, though
membership would require a referendum. Yanukovych’s request to join the customs
union seems not to take into account Ukraine’s membership in the World Trade
Organization since May 2008.
“Yanukovych’s
comments obviously reflect a change in policy,” Yushchenko said at a meeting of
his Our Ukraine Party on Feb. 16.
Yanukovych
has been congratulated on his victory by U.S. President Barack Obama, EU
Commission President Jose Barroso and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, though Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was first to invite him for
an official visit, Interfax reported on Feb. 15.
“Russia
gains by having a friendlier and even preferential relationship but not a
dominant one,” said Chris Weafer, chief strategist at UralSib Financial Corp.
in Moscow. “That delivers the Holy Grail for the Kremlin. Good business and
good politics: Putin’s dream.”
NOTE: With assistance from Kateryna Choursina in Kiev, Lucian Kim and Patrick Henry
in Moscow. Editors: Tasneem Brogger, Chris Kirkham.
To contact the reporters on this story: Daryna Krasnolutska in Kiev at
+38-044-490-1252 or dkrasnolutsk@bloomberg.net
To
contact the editors for this story: Chris Kirkham at +44-20-7673-2464 or ckirkham@bloomberg.net.
LINK:
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-02-17/yanukovych-s-russian-overtures-may-signal-ukraine-s-allegiance.html
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26.
RE-INTRODUCING VIKTOR
YANUKOVYCH
Five
years in the political wilderness has taught Ukraine's apparent next
president that the world does not end with the democratic rotation
of power.
Opinion
Europe, Analysis & Commentary: By Adrian Karatnycky
The Wall Street Journal, NY, NY, Monday, February 8, 2010
The triumph of Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine's presidential election on Sunday
marks the remarkable political comeback of a man who was the pariah of the
Orange Revolution of 2004.
Despite
derisive portrayals (in the media and by his rival Yulia Tymoshenko) of Mr.
Yanukovych as an ex-convict, authoritarian, and captive of the Kremlin who
would reverse Ukraine's democratic progress and block its march toward the
European Union, he was elected narrowly but clearly on Sunday by a margin of
49.5% to 45%, according to an average of independent exit polls.
Given the country's strategic significance, and the Kremlin's persistent
interest in reclaiming Ukraine for Russia's sphere of influence, it is
important that the world have a clear picture of Ukraine's new leader.
Mr.
Yanukovych's biography is as rich and contradictory as Ukraine's tumultuous
transition from Soviet rule to democracy, sovereignty, and the free market.
His
youth seems ripped from a Dickens novel—an orphan growing up in grinding
poverty in an industrial backwater in eastern Ukraine, he spent his teenage
years as a gang member who was twice arrested and convicted for assault and
theft. Though both sentences were quashed in the late 1970s, allowing him to
aspire to high office, Mr. Yanukovych admits to great regrets about his
adolescence.
Eventually,
he earned a degree in mechanical engineering, and for nearly twenty years he
worked as a manager in Ukraine's transportation sector, eventually becoming the
governor of Donetsk, Ukraine's populous steel and coal-mining region.
In
2002, he replaced Viktor Yushchenko as Ukraine's prime minister, and was
handpicked to replace then-President Leonid Kuchma in the 2004 election. That
election was so marred by fraud that it sparked the Orange Revolution and the
victory of Mr. Yushchenko's team of democratic reformers.
Many of the high expectations of the Orange Revolution were unmet amid bitter
political infighting and rampant corruption. But, notwithstanding the chaos,
"Orange" rule also deepened Ukraine's political pluralism, and
allowed time for the political transformation of Mr. Yanukovych and his Party
of Regions.
[1] First, the oligarchs around Mr
Yanukovych became economically transparent. They hired first-rate managers,
rigorously paid their taxes, promoted sophisticated philanthropy, and became
globalized in their tastes and manners. Just as importantly, they now see their
future prosperity integrally linked to a reduction in corruption, the expansion
of free market policies, lower taxes, fewer regulations, and Ukraine's eventual
integration into the rich EU market.
[2] Second, Mr. Yanukovych and other
Regions leaders have become public personalities irrespective of some rough
edges, and have accustomed themselves and found success in the democratic rules
of the game. Five years in the political wilderness has taught them that the
world does not end with the democratic rotation of power, nor does it put
anyone's massive fortunes at risk.
[3] Third, after his political setbacks
in 2005 and 2007, Mr. Yanukovych and his allies were treated dismissively and—say
some of his closest confidantes—humiliated by Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin.
This, and Mr. Putin's tilt last year toward Ms. Tymoshenko, have created
distance between the Regions leadership and Moscow. Coupled with Kyiv's need to
extract Ukraine from its deep economic decline, and a state budget deficit of
12%, this means the world can expect Mr. Yanukovych to eagerly work for close
cooperation with Europe and the U.S., not to mention the International Monetary
Fund.
Indeed,
the signals emanating from Mr. Yanukovych's closest aides, as well as key
leaders from the Our Ukraine coalition with whom I met last week in Kyiv,
suggest the new president and the government he will try to bring into office
will likely represent a broad-based mix of longtime Regions party officials,
and competent financial and economic technocrats and market reformers—including
some from the former Yushchenko team.
For
instance, there is a good chance that banker Serhiy Tyhypko, who finished a
strong third in the presidential race, will be offered the prime minister's
post rather than Mr. Yanukovych's longtime ally and campaign director, Mykola
Azarov, who is also under serious consideration. The odds of a broad-based
coalition are reinforced by the modesty of Mr. Yanukovych's victory, clear-cut
though it was.
All this means that, should the political coalition under discussion take root,
Ukraine will at last achieve an interval of political stability and economic
policy consensus. Ironically, that means Mr. Yanukovych's presidency may move
further toward fulfilling the promises of the Orange Revolution than the
fractious rule of Yushchenko-Tymoshenko ever did.
NOTE:
Adrian Karatnycky is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, Washington,
D.C.
LINK:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870342770457 5051253247492516.html?KEYWORDS=ukraine
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27.
UKRAINE ELECTIONS: LET'S
NOT GET CARRIED AWAY
Commentary
by Nikolas Gvosdev, New Atlanticist Blog
The
Atlantic Council, Wash, D.C., Mon, February 08, 2010
Adrian Karatnycky's analysis of Ukraine's presidential run-off election
[see article 26 above] ends on a positive note. He concludes:
"...the signals emanating from Mr. Yanukovych's closest aides, as
well as key leaders from the Our Ukraine coalition with whom I met last week in
Kyiv, suggest the new president and the government he will try to bring into
office will likely represent a broad-based mix of longtime Regions party
officials, and competent financial and economic technocrats and market
reformers-including some from the former Yushchenko team. ... The odds of a
broad-based coalition are reinforced by the modesty of Mr. Yanukovych's
victory, clear-cut though it was. All this means that, should the political
coalition under discussion take root, Ukraine will at last achieve an interval
of political stability and economic policy consensus."
At present, Ukraine's dreams of joining the Euro-Atlantic community as a full
and integrated member are remote at best. This has nothing to do with any
machinations of the Kremlin (although Moscow surely is not displeased at the
outcome).
With
the economic crisis in Greece the latest reminder that all is not well in the
European Union, there is little appetite for bringing in yet another eastern
European state that would be a net recipient of increasingly scarce Union economic
aid, rather than being a contributor of euros into the common coffer.
A
NATO alliance which is already being stressed over the mission in Afghanistan
is in no position to contemplate taking on additional security liabilities. As
both Yuliya Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych have recognized, there is no
cavalry riding in from the West to secure Ukraine.
Nor
is it to the benefit of the Ukrainian people to hear from Western pundits about
their country's "choice" in the last elections to "turn its
back" on Europe and the West. Joining the West was not on offer, and
Ukraine was not well served by those who advised it to take a more
confrontational stand with Russia.
Ukraine needs a period of peace and quiet where its economy can recover and
grow. The only chance Kyiv has for making the case that its future lies in
Europe is to show that Ukraine would not be a net consumer of increasingly
scare economic and security resources.
It
is not just a matter of breaking through the German-Russian partnership to
convince a skeptical leadership in Berlin, it is also convincing states like
Spain, Portugal, and Italy that further expansion to the east benefits the
countries that comprise the southern tier of Europe.
For
this to happen, "Ukraine" and "crisis" have to become words
increasingly separated in the minds of existing EU and NATO member states. A
Yanukovych pause might just be what Ukraine's European future needs.
NOTE:
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is on the faculty
of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not
reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government.
LINK:
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/ukraine-elections-lets-not-get-carried-away
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28.
'THE SOVIET STORY': A
MUST SEE DOCUMENTARY
Commentary: By Robert McConnell, Vice President, Armor Designs
Co-Founder of U.S.-Ukraine Foundation (USUF)
Washington, D.C., Saturday, January 27, 2010
WASHINGTON, D.C. - In May, 2008, "The Soviet Story"
premiered in the European Parliament where it now has been screened several
times. Since then The Soviet Story has been screened on national
television in 10 countries and has won several prestigious awards at film festivals.
It has been seen by audiences in Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Israel, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Ukraine. Screenings are pending for
Australia, Asia, Greece, Italy, and Poland. In the United States, public
broadcasting stations began screening the film in October 2009 and to date the
film has been screened by 13 television stations, many of which are members of
the PBS network.
And,
last Friday clips of an interview with the writer/director, Edvins Snore,
and numerous clips from the film were included and highlighted in an hour-long
national special on the Fox Cable Network’s Glenn Beck show.
There
is so much to say about "The Soviet Story" and why it is worthy of
your attention and should be shown to audiences everywhere. So much of
20th Century history has been forgotten, ignored and has or is being
rewritten. It is important to see things seldom talked about and see how
events tie together that are seldom, if ever, tied together - - events that
have significant relevance to the current world situation.
COLLABORATION BETWEEN NAZI AND SOVIET SYSTEMS
The
documentary illustrates the close philosophical and political similarities and
collaboration between the Nazi and Soviet systems in the years leading up to
and during WWII, (as the war began and started to spread, the Axis Powers
included the Soviet Union), the crimes of the Soviet Union, as well as, the
impact of the Soviet legacy on modern day Europe. The film shows recently
uncovered archive documents revealing how the Soviet Union helped Nazi Germany
instigate the Holocaust.
Through
interviews with western and Russian historians, members of the European
Parliament and victims of Soviet terror, the film goes into shocking detail and
uncovers new information about the following events: the Great Purge, the
Great Famine, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Katyn massacre, Gestapo-NKVD
collaboration, Soviet mass deportations and medical experiments in the
GULAG.
Edvins
Snore’s research is thorough, his presentation precise and documented.
So, though official Russia has tried to discredit the film, the Kremlin has no
genuine facts to counter "The Soviet Story." The reality
remains that Russia needs to come to terms with its past. Not doing so
retards its governance, diminishes its people and makes honest and open
relations with its neighbors a very slippery slope.
A
Latvian native Snore, 35, is both the author of "The Soviet Story"
script and the director of the film. "The Soviet Story" is his debut
feature documentary. As a Master of Political Science, Edvins Snore
studied the subject and collected materials for the film over 10 years and then
spent over two years filming in Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Germany, France, the
United Kingdom and Belgium.
EVERYONE SHOULD SEE "THE SOVIET STORY"
Everyone
should see "The Soviet Story." No serious student of history or
public official facing the complex dimensions of current international affairs
can afford not to do so.
NOTE:
Link to buy CD of "THE SOVIET STORY": http://buyukraine.org/digiShop/cart.php?m=product_detail&p=323
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29.
NO REFUTING THE HARD
TRUTHS IN 'THE SOVIET STORY'
By Peter Worthington, Columnist, The Toronto Sun
Toronto,
Ontario, Canada, Wednesday, 3 Feb 2010
TORONTO - Those who are concerned that once history is
distorted, it often never gets corrected, can breathe easier after a
startlingly accurate
documentary
was premiered this past Sunday at the Ukrainian Cultural Centre in Toronto.
Even so, The Soviet Story, made two years ago and shown mostly in the Baltic
states and Europe, has resulted in angry protests in communist quarters. The
documentary's young writer and director, Edvin Snores, a Latvian, has been
hanged in effigy and denounced as a liar by some in the European Parliament.
One Russian historian publicly regretted having taken part in the film - a film
in which he did not take part. Such is the outrage. The Economist urged
"those who want to ban it should try refuting it first."
I've seen the film (it premiered in the U.S. six months ago) and, put bluntly,
it cannot be refuted. Rejected, maybe; offensive to some sensitivities,
perhaps; horrifying, undoubtedly; painful, without doubt. But refuted?
Impossible.
The core theme is the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin was mentor to Hitler and
the Nazis. Until Hitler turned on his ally, Stalin and the USSR were Hitler's
partners in war, with a treaty to divide Europe once the pesky problem of
defeating Britain had been solved.
Most
people do not realize - or have forgotten, or never knew - how closely Nazi
propaganda emulated Soviet propaganda - similar images of muscular men in
posters, smiling young women, all working for the improvement of mankind by
eliminating human trash like Jews, Serbs, Gypsies, even Scotsmen!
The genesis for genocide to rid the world of the weak or unwanted, originated
with Karl Marx who, around 1849, wrote: "Killing is justified, especially
if it cleanses society." Lenin agreed, Stalin expanded the creed and
Hitler copied it.
In the early days of the Second World War, Jews who fled Germany to the USSR
were rounded up by the NKVD and turned over to the Nazis.
Where Hitler and Stalin differed in building a pure society and better human
beings, was Hitler digressed from Stalin's formula of "class warfare"
and
introduced "racial cleansing." Hitler watched with envy how the NKVD
eliminated seven million Ukrainians by imposing the world's first man-made
famine on Ukraine in 1932-33, confiscating all food and making record sales of
Ukrainian grain to Europe.
The world paid no attention - the few journalists who did (Malcolm Muggeridge)
were ignored. The New York Times correspondent in Moscow, Walter
Duranty, won a Pulitzer Prize for dodging the famine.
The film footage is ghastly but persuasive. Mountains of skeletal, starved
bodies are bulldozed into mass graves. Vivid photos of victims shot in the head
and tumbling into mass graves. There is Katyn Forest, where 20,000 Polish
reservists were shot, some buried alive in mass graves, and our side pretended
the Germans did it.
The world remembers the horrors of the Nazi death camps, but we hunger to
forget, if we can, the 20-plus million who died in the Soviet Gulag at the
whim of our wartime ally, "Uncle Joe."
Among Edvin Snores' interviews are aging women who recall the famine, the
massacre of their families, the Gulag. Painful, but essential to record. With
younger generations reluctant to believe history, it's important there be a
source for unvarnished truth.
LINK: http://www.torontosun.com/news/columnists/peter_worthington/2010/02/03/12730236.html
LINK:
http://www.sovietstory.com:80/
LINK: http://buyukraine.org/digiShop/cart.php?m=product_detail&p=323
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30.
THE SOVIET STORY: FILM
TELLS THE STORY OF THE SOVIET REGIME
BuyUkraine.org
website, USUF, Washington, D.C. Fall, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The new multi-language official DVD of The
Soviet Story is now on sale. The DVD also contains bonus interviews not yet
screened, a director’s statement and color film booklet. The film is in
English. Each DVD contains subtitles in 15 languages.
Follow the link below to see a trailer: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqEf2FSbrdY
“The Soviet Story” is a story of an Allied power, which helped the Nazis to
fight Jews and which slaughtered its own people on an industrial scale.
Assisted by the West, this power triumphed on May 9th, 1945. Its crimes were
made taboo, and the complete story of Europe’s most murderous regime has never
been told. Until now…
SYNOPSIS:
The film tells the story of the Soviet regime:
[1] The Great Famine in Ukraine
(1932/33)
[2] The Katyn massacre (1940)
[3] The SS-KGB partnership [in the
late 1930s the KGB was called NKVD, more info>]
[4] Soviet mass deportations
[5] Medical experiments in the
GULAG.
These are just a few of the subjects covered in the film. “The Soviet Story”
also discusses the impact of the Soviet legacy on modern day Europe. Listen to
experts and European MPs discussing the implications of a selective attitude
towards mass murder; and meet a woman describing the burial of her new born son
in a GULAG concentration camp. The Soviet Story is a story of pain, injustice
and “realpolitik”.
FILM FACTS
Title: “The Soviet Story”; Type: Documentary film; Genre: History,
politics; Director: Edvins Snore' Language: English' Length: 85 min.
Date of production: 2008, Cost $30.00.
”The Soviet Story” was filmed over 2 years in Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Germany,
France, UK and Belgium. Material for the documentary was collected by the
author, Edvins Snore, for more than 10 years. As a result, ”The Soviet Story”
presents a truly unique insight into recent Soviet history, told by people,
once Soviet citizens, who have first hand knowledge of it.
Unique video footage
Rare footage
shot in 1990, the last year of the USSR, shows an abandoned Soviet death-camp
in Magadan, Siberia, where the KGB had carried out medical experiments on
prisoners. The film also presents never before broadcasted Nazi footage showing
Soviets helping Hitler launch WW2 and providing aid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg.
Exclusive images
”The Soviet Story” features a number of photographs taken by Heinrich Hoffmann,
Hitler’s personal photographer. These pictures have never before been shown to
the public. The film also presents several shocking Nazi documents found by the
film’s author in the Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry (2007).
NTSC format - “Region Free/All Regions” - (North America [USA / Canada /
Mexico], Brazil, Chile, Japan, Korea, Peru, Taiwan, Venezuela.)
PBS STATIONS TO SCREEN 'THE SOVIET STORY
PRESS
RELEASE: PERRY STREET ADVISORS LLC, October 6, 2009
On October 11, 2009, PBS stations throughout the United States will have access
to ‘The Soviet Story’, the awardwinning and highly acclaimed documentary film
by Edvins Šnore (www.sovietstory.com).
The
film’s distributor Daris Delins notes: „We have reached another important
milestone in the distribution of the film. Via PBS distributor NETA (National
Educational Telecomunications Association – www.netaonline.org ) the film will
now be accessible to NETA’s 172 members that comprise 340 PBS stations across
the United States.
Each
of these PBS stations will now be able to screen the film. Even before NETA
approached us we had received very positive feedback from PBS member stations
who had viewed the film. Given PBS stations are very selective about what they
screen, NETA’s acceptance of the film is an important acknowledgement of the
film and its potential audience reach. Many Americans will be now be able to
learn about this important period of history and how it still resonates today.”
The first PBS station in the U.S. scheduled to air the film will be WDSC 15
Daytona Beach on October 15 at 9:00 pm. Other PBS member stations that have
already indicated their interest to screen the film include: KAET 8, Phoenix,
Arizona; KPBS 15, San Diego, California; WEDU 13, Tampa, Florida; WTIU 30
Bloomington, Indiana; IPTV, Iowa Public TV, Iowa; MPT (Maryland Public TV),
Maryland; NHPTV (New Hampshire Public TV), New Hampshire, WHYY 12,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and WNED, Buffalo, New York. Following the NETA
release, more stations are expected to follow, particularly as viewers get news
that the film is accessible by their local station.
Overseas, in the coming months the film will be screened on national TV in
Greece (ERT), Italy (Fox), Poland (TVP) and Spain (History Channel). In Sweden
the national network SVT will screen the film on December 5. The film has
already aired on national TV in Belarus, Estonia, Georgia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Sloevnia and Ukraine.
At the end of 2009 a 2nd edition DVD of the film will be released. This new DVD
will include additional subtitled languages including: Belarussian, Bulgarian,
Danish, Dutch, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, Norwegian, Portguese, Romanian,
Serbian, Slovenian, Turkish, and Vietnamese. This will bring the total number
of foreign language translations for the film to 28.
LINK:
http://buyukraine.org/digiShop/cart.php?m=product_detail&p=323
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